98TH CONGRESS
1st Session

SENATE

S. Doc.
98-16

DANGEROUS STALEMATE: SUPERPOWER RELATIONS IN AUTUMN 1983

A REPORT OF A DELEGATION OF EIGHT SENATORS TO THE SOVIET UNION

TO THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

SEPTEMBER 1983

Ordered to be printed September 22, 1983

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
24-468 O WASHINGTON : 1983

5920-7

SENATE DELEGATION TO THE SOVIET UNION

(AUGUST 17–28, 1983)

CLAIBORNE PELL, *Delegation Chairman*
RUSSELL B. LONG
DALE BUMPERS
PATRICK J. LEAHY
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.
PAUL S. SARBANES
JIM SASSER

STAFF

PATRICK J. GRIFFIN, *Secretary for the Minority*
JOHN B. RITCH III, *Committee on Foreign Relations*
GEORGE W. ASHWORTH, *Committee on Foreign Relations*
ERIC NEWSOM, *Professional Staff Member*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Hon. ROBERT C. BYRD,
Minority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. LEADER: Lord Grey, Britain's Foreign Minister during World War I, concluded in his memoirs that "nations are always making mistakes because they do not understand each other's psychology." Here Grey echoed the French diplomat Tallyrand, who warned that for each hour spent negotiating with an adversary, a statesman should spend 10 minutes trying to understand how it feels to be inside his adversary's skin.

With such counsel in mind and under your sponsorship, our delegation visited the Soviet Union from August 17th to August 28th. Our purposes were threefold: to learn more about Soviet attitudes and policies; to convey to Soviet leaders an American perspective; and to explore current issues for points of possible compromise.

Enroute to the Soviet Union, the delegation stopped in Helsinki to confer with Finland's Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, a Social Democrat who has headed the Finnish Government for much of the last decade. Sorsa spoke impressively of his country's "special position" between two power blocs and his conviction that Finland's foreign policy of neutrality, friendly relations with the U.S.S.R., and close links with the Nordic nations preserves its independence as a democracy. "Finns take their situation as natural; we know the Soviet Union better than most—perhaps all—peoples."

Sorsa has met with Soviet Presidium Chairman Andropov twice and finds him "exceptionally well informed" and self-confident. He believes that Andropov's primary goal is to strengthen the Soviet economy by curbing its inefficiencies, perhaps by trying "quite radical approaches." On the international front, Sorsa views the down-turn in United States-Soviet relations as injurious to the whole climate of East-West relations, and he described the current Soviet leadership as "deeply suspicious of the intentions of the present Administration."

In the Soviet Union, our deliberations centered in Moscow. There the delegation met for 2 hours with Chairman Andropov (see Section I) and conferred in several sessions with members of the Supreme Soviet and with representatives of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute, the latter being the Soviet regime's principal "think tank" on United States-U.S.S.R. relations. In addition, individual delegation members met with Soviet officials holding various ministerial responsibilities, and with leaders of religious and social organizations.

The delegation felt a deep sense of concern about the plight of Jews, Pentecostals, Baptists, Orthodox believers, and others who have suffered as a consequence of religious belief or the desire to emigrate from the Soviet Union; and about the continuing persecution of Soviet citizens who sought to monitor their country's compliance with the Helsinki Accords. In Moscow and during subsequent stops in the U.S.S.R., delegation members spent many hours meeting with scores of such persons and, in the case of those who have been imprisoned, their relatives.

Leaving Moscow, the delegation visited Leningrad, Tashkent, Tbilisi, and, more briefly, Zagorsk, Samarkand, and Telavi—cities which highlight the extraordinary diversity of a continent-spanning Soviet population of 270 million. Leningrad, the U.S.S.R.'s second largest city, symbolizes Russia's ties to Europe and also the human tragedy of war; the city's poignant cemetery holds one-half million of the 20 million Soviet citizens who perished in World War II, the "Great Patriotic War." Tashkent, capital of the cotton-producing Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan, serves as the U.S.S.R.'s economic and cultural window on the Third World; each year its university hosts thousands of foreign students from Asia and Africa. Tbilisi, capital of the Caucasian Republic of Georgia, displays an energetic and independent spirit while offering a rich example of the Soviet mosaic; its population of just over 1 million contains 15 major nationalities.

Delegation members appreciated the extensive efforts and cordial hospitality of their governmental hosts and escorts. The delegation also wishes to note the genuine friendliness conveyed by ordinary Soviet citizens toward their American visitors. The contrast between this natural warmth and the frigid state of bilateral relations today was a continual reminder of work to be done.

Departing the Soviet Union, the delegation stopped in Rome and met with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and His Holiness Pope John Paul II. A seasoned politician and diplomat, Andreotti emphasized the basic elements of NATO's December 1979 decision on INF: (1) NATO must not deviate from its deployment plan unless an agreement is concluded which preserves Alliance security; and (2) NATO, by negotiating seriously to achieve a stabilizing INF agreement, must make it clear that the responsibility for failing to reach an agreement, and hence the necessity for deployment, rests with the U.S.S.R. Following a general audience, the pontiff spoke to us briefly but impressively of the "grave responsibilities" which the United States must bear and fulfill.

Returning to the United States, delegation members were agreed that this trip, which brought to exactly 50 the number of Senators who have visited the U.S.S.R., had provided each member with insights critically relevant to the work of the Senate. Within hours of our arrival home, the world was shocked by the outrageous news that a Soviet fighter aircraft had shot down and destroyed a civilian Korean jetliner carrying 269 innocent victims—an inexplicable act of barbarism. That tragedy has not, however, caused us to revise the recommendations in this report pertaining to the urgency of nuclear arms control. Indeed, by demonstrating that the specter of military miscalculation is not an idle fear but a real possibility, this episode should serve as a spur to achieving limits on the

superpower arsenals. Accordingly, we were encouraged that the Administration not only sought to elicit a broad-based international condemnation of the Soviet crime, but also declared its intent to remain fully engaged in arms negotiations aimed at stabilizing the nuclear balance. In closing we note with appreciation that the main task of preparing this report has fallen upon John Ritch, ably assisted by Bill Ashworth and Eric Newsom.

Sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL,
Delegation Chairman.
RUSSELL B. LONG.
DALE BUMPERS.
PATRICK J. LEAHY.
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM.
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr.
PAUL S. SARBANES.
JIM SASSER.

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal	III
I. Executive Summary	1
II. Meeting with Chairman Andropov	5
III. Key Issues and Recommendations	9
A. The Human Rights Dilemma	9
B. Afghanistan and Its Consequences	10
C. The Value of Exchanges	11
D. Arms Control in Space	13
E. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces	14
F. Strategic Arms Reduction	16
G. A Consolidated Nuclear Arms Negotiation	17
H. Nuclear Test Bans	17
I. Chemical and Biological Weapons	18
J. Confidence-Building Measures	19
K. Arms Control Verification and Compliance	20
IV. Conclusions	22
V. Appendixes:	
A. Statement by Chairman Andropov (Kremlin, August 18, 1983)	25
B. Statement by Senator Pell (Kremlin, August 18, 1983)	29
C. Statement by Senator Leahy (Kremlin, August 18, 1983)	32
D. Delegation Press Conference Statement (Spaso House, August 18, 1983)	34
E. Soviet Treaty Proposal Concerning the Non-Militarization of Space (released August 22, 1983)	35
F. Background on Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. (prepared by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe)	37


GREENLAND
ICELAND
ALASKA (U.S.)
North Pole
Arctic Ocean
U.K.
NORWAY
DEN.
SWEDEN
FINLAND
Murmansk
POLAND
Riga
Leningrad
Arkhangel'sk
Minsk
Moscow
Kiyev
U.S.S.R.
Yakutsk
Kuybyshev
Sverdlovsk
Volgograd
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Irkutsk
Khabarovsk
Aral Sea
Yerevan
Baku
Ulaanbaatar
Ha-erh-pin
Vladivostok
MONGOLIA
IRAQ
Tehran
Tashkent
Wu-lu-mu-ch'i
Shen-yang
NORTH KOREA
Pyongyang
Tokyo
IRAN
K'o-shih
Pao-t'ou
Peking
Seoul
KUWAIT
Indian Claim
Ch'ing-tao
SOUTH KOREA
JAPAN
Kabul
AFGHAN.
Islamabad
Chinese line of control
Lan-chou
CHINA
Hsi-an
QATAR
PAKISTAN
Shang-hai
U.A.E.
New Delhi
NEPAL
La-sa
Wu-han
Ch'eng-tu
OMAN
Karachi
Kathmandu
BH.
Taipei
Ahmadabad
BANG.
K'un-ming
Kuang-chou
TAIWAN
Tokyo to Singapore (2,899 nmi) by Sea
INDIA
Calcutta
Dacca
MACAO
HONG KONG
Arabian Sea
Bombay
BURMA
Hanoi
LAOS
Pacific Ocean
Qatar to Singapore (3,600 nmi) by Sea
Hyderabad
Rangoon
Vientiane
Luzon
VIETNAM
Manila
Bay of Bengal
Bangalore
Madras
THAILAND
PHILIPPINES
Bangkok
CAMBODIA
Phnom Penh
Ho Chi Minh City
Mindanao
SRI LANKA
Colombo
Sabah
BRUNEI
Kuala Lumpur
Sarawak
MALDIVES
Medan
MALAYSIA
Singapore
Diego Garcia to Singapore (2,224 nm) by Sea
Sumatra
Kalimantan
Sulawesi
Banjarmasin
Palembang
Diego Garcia
INDONESIA
Diego Garcia to Darwin (3,483 nmi) by Sea
Jakarta
Java
Darwin
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA
Perth
Legend:
Capital
City
0 1200 Miles
0 1200 Kilometers
Locations of symbols are approximate.
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative

24-468 O - 83 - 2

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV

The delegation's 2-hour meeting with Presidium Chairman Yuri Andropov consisted of the presentation of prepared statements by both sides and a period of discussion. On the topics of human rights and regional conflicts, no new ground was broken. In the area of arms control, however, Andropov offered two initiatives.

First, he declared that the U.S.S.R. would not "place in space" any anti-satellite weapons so long as the United States adheres to the same policy. As the delegation pointed out in its press conference following the Andropov meeting, this unilateral moratorium may be aimed simply at trying to galvanize international opinion against the now-scheduled U.S. tests of an anti-satellite system that is expected to eliminate the Soviet lead in this field.

Second, Andropov proposed a new treaty on space-related weapons which entails: (1) a complete ban of tests and deployment of any space-based weapons; and (2) a ban on all anti-satellite systems, including the dismantling of systems now in existence. Although the Soviets had previously proposed a ban on space-based weapons, the proposal to dismantle existing anti-satellite systems and to ban new systems was new.

In addition, when pressed on the issue of verification procedures for arms control agreements, Chairman Andropov strongly affirmed Soviet willingness to accept all measures necessary.

2. POLICY AFTER THE KOREAN AIRLINE MASSACRE

While supporting international efforts to bring the Soviet Union to account for this brutal act, the delegation agrees with two statements made by President Reagan in his speech concerning subsequent U.S. policy toward the Soviets: "we must not give up our effort to bring them into the world community of nations"; and "we cannot, we must not, give up our effort to reduce the arsenals of destructive weapons threatening the world." The delegation has shaped its recommendations accordingly.

3. ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

While viewing with appropriate skepticism the Soviet proposal for a joint moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons, the delegation believes that the Soviet treaty proposal—to ban all space-based weapons and to dismantle and ban anti-satellite weapons—should be treated seriously. To determine whether the Soviets are genuinely interested in such a comprehensive ban and are will-

ing to accept necessary verification measures, the Administration should move expeditiously to reopen negotiations on this subject.

4. START/INF NEGOTIATIONS

In the months ahead, the United States should demonstrate a maximum of seriousness and flexibility in both negotiations—in the interests of achieving stabilizing agreements and of demonstrating that, if INF deployments *are* necessary, the responsibility rests with the U.S.S.R. As a way of eliminating some of the political, military, and technical issues which have impeded negotiating progress in Geneva, consideration should be given to consolidating the START and INF negotiations at an early date.

5. NUCLEAR TEST BAN

To get test ban efforts back on track, the Administration should (a) submit the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty to the Senate for consent to ratification; (b) reserve the right to seek expanded verification procedures, if necessary, subsequently through separate negotiation; and (c) resume efforts immediately to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

6. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The Administration should press the Soviets on the question of biological weapons production and stockpiling. If the Soviets are not so engaged, Chairman Andropov should be called upon to say so and to take immediate steps to resolve fully all questions that have arisen. At the same time, the Administration should press hard for an immediate resumption of bilateral negotiations—to put the Soviets to the test of devising an adequate scheme of on-site verification.

7. HUMAN RIGHTS

In its meetings with Chairman Andropov and other Soviet officials, the delegation made strong representations concerning a wide range of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. The delegation is not optimistic that such representations, however persistent, will bring rapid improvement in Soviet behavior. Although harsh, stolid and oppressive, the Soviet system appears stable and little susceptible to outside pressure. Recent history indicates that human rights improvements are most likely to occur as tensions ease in East-West relations. Accordingly, each superpower faces a dilemma. American attitudes and beliefs are such that Soviet aspirations for improved bilateral relations are likely to be frustrated in the absence of improvements in Soviet human rights policy. But the realities of Soviet politics are such that these human rights improvements are most probable in an atmosphere of improved superpower relations. Faced with this conundrum, American policymakers must move actively on all fronts—forcefully and publicly condemning Soviet human rights violations while, at the same time, seeking business-like accords which promote widened communication and exchange and which enhance military stability through arms control. This approach should serve not only the

American security interest, but also the American interest in human rights.

8. POLITICAL EXCHANGES

During its meetings in the Soviet Union, the delegation underscored the dangers when political leaders of the superpowers have no first-hand acquaintance with each other or each other's countries. As matters now stand, neither the President, nor three-quarters of the House of Representatives, nor half the Senate has ever been to the Soviet Union. On the Soviet side, the statistics are worse. Yuri Andropov and most other members of the Politburo have not even traveled outside the Communist bloc. Because United States-Soviet political exchanges have become mired in preconditions and political "linkage," the delegation recommends the establishment of non-governmental offices in each capital, to facilitate bilateral travel and contact between Soviet and American political leaders. The delegation also supports more immediate and direct action, and therefore recommends that the Senate consider extending to all Politburo members a direct invitation to visit the United States for purposes of first-hand contact and frank discussions which will, among other benefits, serve to make the American viewpoint unmistakably clear.

9. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES

Noting that a recent Administration report (prepared in response to Congressional mandate) shows that the United States has benefited at least as much as the Soviet Union from the scientific and technical exchanges that began in the early 1970's, the delegation recommends that scientific and technical agreements which have been allowed to languish or expire should eventually be returned to a full level of cooperative activity. It is not only self-defeating but a failure of world responsibility to forgo the humanitarian and ecological achievements that can emanate from such superpower cooperation.

10. EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

The delegation recommends the formal establishment of a United States-Soviet student-exchange-for-peace program, to be directed by a bilateral commission that would oversee the exchange of up to 5,000 students and teachers from each side.

11. ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Concerned by accumulating reports of possible Soviet violations of several arms accords (including those unratified but being informally observed), the delegation was careful to make three fundamental points to Chairman Andropov and other Soviet officials: (1) unexplained, questionable Soviet activities regarding arms agreements are of concern to Senators across the entire political spectrum and can easily jeopardize the basis of Senate support for arms control; (2) adequate explanations concerning recent reports must be immediately forthcoming; and (3) the future of the arms control process—including the ratification prospect for any treaty—de-

pends upon Soviet acceptance of the security and political importance to the United States of full mutual respect for arms control obligations and upon Soviet recognition of the necessity for adequate verification measures.

II. MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV

Yuri V. Andropov acceded to the U.S.S.R.'s top Communist Party position on November 12, 1982, one day after the announcement of Leonid Brezhnev's death. Andropov had by that time been a Politburo member since 1973, and had directed the KGB from 1967 until a few months earlier. Previously, he served for 10 years in the Party secretariat with responsibility for Party relations within the Warsaw Pact. Before that, at the age of 42, Andropov was ambassador to Hungary during the uprising and repression of 1956. Rumors circulating when Andropov took power, that he is in fact a "closet liberal," are belied by his long career of dedicated service to Soviet orthodoxy.

Andropov's selection as General Secretary, apparently arranged before Brezhnev's passing, was presumably a consensus decision within the Soviet leadership. But evidence of the depth of and basis for that consensus is lacking. By most accounts, Andropov is a political loner; he was a friend but not a protege of Brezhnev's and—unusual for the Soviet Union—apparently has few proteges of his own. In June this year, Andropov consolidated his position somewhat by assuming the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, thereby becoming head of state as well as of Party.

Most notable since Andropov's ascent are his campaign against official corruption and, relatedly, his experimentation with more decentralized economic decision-making. It is by no means clear, however, that vast forces of inertia and vested interest will allow substantial progress in these areas. To boost Soviet living standards, Andropov could look for resources in the defense budget, which now consumes an estimated 14–16 percent of the country's GNP and the talents of its best scientists and managers. But any such change would require the acquiescence of a military hierarchy which became accustomed to a dominant share during the Soviet drive to achieve strategic parity with the United States. And that in turn would almost certainly require a genuine normalization of East-West relations and a far-reaching regime of arms control.

The delegation met with Chairman Andropov at a time of dangerous stalemate in superpower relations. The essential currency of the relationship—arms negotiation—has faltered across the entire spectrum. Trade and other bilateral contacts stand sharply curtailed. Mutual criticism has become harsher than at any time since the 1950's. And Soviet warnings against NATO's imminent deployment of Euro-missiles, scheduled to begin in December this year, have raised fears of a still stormier East-West climate. It was against this background—in Andropov's first lengthy meeting with U.S. officials and his first meeting with a Congressional delega-

tion—that the delegation sought to assess the Soviet leader's views on current issues.

Andropov's opening statement, reprinted in Appendix A, emphasized the following points.

Worsened United States-Soviet Relations.—The downturn in United States-Soviet relations "is not our choice" but rather emanates from those on the American side who prefer a "game without rules" to pursue a fantasy of strategic superiority. In contrast, the Soviets wish to achieve a "level of accord" and "to do business on an equal basis."

INF.—"Much is at stake" in NATO's planned INF deployments in Western Europe. If deployments proceed, the U.S.S.R.—being in greater jeopardy—will have no choice but to respond so that "Americans will also feel the difference" between the old situation and the new. It is unfortunate, he said, that the United States will not actively consider the Soviet INF proposal, which would leave the U.S.S.R. with fewer missiles than it had in 1976, before SS–20 deployments began. In contrast to some American thinking, the Soviets will not make unilateral concessions, "even 5 minutes prior to the deployment."

START.—As long as the United States continues to propose terms that would "break the structure" of Soviet strategic forces, there is no hope for agreement.

Nuclear Freeze.—Because "technology is developing faster than negotiations," a freeze on United States and Soviet strategic weaponry is desirable. This would mean no increases in the number of deployed missiles, no development or testing of new missile types, and strict limitations on modernizing existing weapons. A broader, total freeze would also be acceptable. How can the United States argue that a freeze would "consolidate" Soviet advantages when the Joint Chiefs regularly affirm that they would not wish to exchange arsenals with the Soviets?

Arms in Space.—The Soviet Union wishes to come to an agreement on a complete ban of "any space-based weapons for striking targets on earth, in the air and in space" and an agreement that would "eliminate anti-satellite systems already in existence and ban creation of new ones." [See Appendix E for Soviet treaty proposal.] In addition, the U.S.S.R. undertakes unilaterally not to "place in space" any anti-satellite weapons so long as the United States adheres to the same policy.[1]

Regional Issues.—It is unfortunate that the United States seems inclined "to explain away nearly every international problem, without much further ado, as 'Communist plotting' or even simply 'Moscow intrigues.' "

Soviet Goals.—The U.S.S.R. is engaged in the extensive task of trying to raise economic efficiency "to improve the life of the people, raising its material and spiritual level." Soviet foreign policy therefore aims to achieve peace and security.

Speaking for the delegation, Senator Pell responded with opening remarks (see Appendix B) which:

---

[1] See discussion under section titled "Arms Control in Space."

Underscored the dangers when superpower political leaders are not acquainted with each other and each other's countries; [2]

Stressed that the pace of Soviet armament is a principal factor fueling American arms programs;

Emphasized that Soviet adventurism in the world is incompatible with détente;

Declared that the Helsinki Final Act makes governmental violation of basic human rights in the U.S.S.R. a matter of legitimate international concern;

Raised certain topics for further discussion.

During the discussion period, Chairman Andropov reiterated Soviet concern with planned NATO INF deployments, which he argued would bring the Soviet Union under the threat of attack with only 6 minutes' warning, while Soviet missiles could reach the United States in "not less than 20 minutes." As to the possibility raised by Senator Pell of merging the START and INF negotiations, Andropov asked why the two talks should be merged when the United States does not want agreement in either. He indicated that he had given the matter some consideration by noting that "we have not taken a decision." NATO deployments of Pershing and cruise missiles, he warned, could call the whole negotiating process into question.

As to the value of mutual familiarization, Andropov took a one-sided approach, saying that there was "not enough knowledge" about the Soviet Union in America. The Soviet Union should perhaps do more to make its case, "but even what we do doesn't get through" to Americans. Concerning the idea of a summit meeting even if major agreements were not to be signed, Andropov demurred. He referred to current talks aimed at modernizing the United States-Soviet hot-line and asked, sharply, "Should the Presidents of these two countries sit down to talk about telephones?" He concluded: "Until the United States is really prepared to talk about substantial issues, a summit would not be sound, despite the way it may look from the sidelines."

As to allegations of Soviet adventurism, Andropov countered by referring to American pressure on Nicaragua and French involvement in Chad. In Afghanistan, he said, the Soviet position is unchanged: "we will leave" when a stable political solution has been achieved. In Angola, he argued, there was "not a single footprint of a Soviet soldier." The situation in Poland, he implied, has been handled with relative moderation. "Your representative went there, and also the Pope—he's not your representative but he certainly acted like one."

Human rights, Andropov declared, is an "intricate and complex issue" on which "we have different understandings in principle" arising from different ideologies. "We would not try to convert you to our ideology; you should not try to convert us." Addressing the cases of prominent dissidents cited in Senator Pell's opening statement, Andropov began by describing Andrei Sakharov as "a mentally sick man" who has written an article "calling for war" (an egregious characterization of Sakharov's recent piece in "Foreign

[2] See discussion under section titled "The Value of Exchanges."

Affairs"). Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov have been "properly imprisoned under our penal code" and must serve their terms. Referring to the Swedish hero-diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, missing since World War II, Andropov stated that the Soviets had time and again provided "relevant proof" that Wallenberg is "not in this country."

On the emigration issue, Andropov claimed that Soviet policy had been reasonable. He asserted that since 1945 273,000 Jews have emigrated and that 92 percent of all applications had been processed favorably. Of the other 8 percent, "most have had access to matters involving state secrets or are serving time as common criminals."

Pressed three times as to whether the Soviets would agree to all measures necessary to allow verification of the anti-satellite treaty he proposed and other arms control agreements, Andropov responded without specifics but in the affirmative, finally saying "Of course!" they will be verifiable. "The real question is whether we will have something [an agreement] to verify."

III. KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Human Rights Dilemma

In its meeting with Chairman Andropov, the delegation left with the Soviet leader letters expressing deep concern and protest over governmental abuse of a number of individuals and groups:

Citizens, including Yuri Orlov and others specifically named, who have been harassed and imprisoned for efforts to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords;

Citizens, some specifically named, who have been harassed, committed to psychiatric hospitals, or imprisoned for efforts to plead publicly for peace;

Jews and other citizens, many specifically named, who cannot emigrate and are prevented from joining their families;

Baptists who have been harassed and imprisoned as religious believers;

Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate now in internal exile;

Anatoly Shcharansky, the human rights activist now in prison;

Sergei Khodorovich, imprisoned for work on the Russian Social Fund, an organization established by Nobel-prize winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn; and

Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, still unaccounted for 38 years after passing into custody of the Red Army.

To Chairman Andropov and other Soviet officials, the delegation repeatedly emphasized that the Helsinki Accords represent international obligations freely undertaken by the Soviet Union; that U.S. officials and citizens will continue, as a matter of deeply-felt humanitarian principle, to protest Soviet violations; and that continued perpetration of flagrant human rights abuses would be a major obstacle to significantly improved relations with a free and democratic society such as the United States. The delegation is not optimistic that such representations, however persistent, will bring rapid improvement in Soviet behavior.

Some Americans contend that the Soviet system faces a crisis of economic and political stability and that if sufficiently pressed the Soviet regime will lose domestic control. We believe this notion reflects wishful thinking, and can lead to dangerous policy misjudgments.

Politically, the Soviet regime rests firmly on a conformist mentality that has deep historical and sociological origins long predating even the October Revolution in 1917. Historians point to this mentality, which values consensus and economic security over personal liberties, in explaining the continuing hold of communism on

the Soviet people. Clearly, the Soviet system faces systemic economic problems, most especially low industrial productivity and quality and a chronically-weak agricultural system which uses 20 percent of Soviet manpower, yet still requires huge food imports. Nonetheless the Soviet GNP continues to grow, albeit slowly, thereby bringing a rising standard of living.

Like people everywhere, Soviet citizens tend to compare their current situation not to that of peoples in other countries but to their own past, which shows a far grimmer picture than today's. Many Soviet citizens do see the United States as an example of cultural and technological dynamism. But fewer seem convinced that America, with its well-publicized crime and unemployment, offers an economic model applicable to them. They also view American democracy as something of a political circus, not the least consequence of which is a dangerously erratic foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, however stolid and inefficient their own system, they see it offering free secondary and higher education and health care, ample pensions and low-cost food and housing.

Accordingly, it is unrealistic to base American policy on the premise that the Soviet system is about to fail or that its leadership will, under U.S. pressure, make far-reaching concessions. Indeed, if recent history is any guide—and statistics on Jewish emigration over the past decade offer some evidence (see Appendix F)—improvements in certain human rights are more likely to occur as tensions ease in superpower relations.

Each side thus faces a dilemma. As the delegation emphasized to Kremlin officials, American attitude and beliefs are such that Soviet aspirations for improved relations are likely to be frustrated in the absence of improvements in Soviet human rights policy. But the realities of Soviet politics are such that these human rights improvements are most likely to occur—over the short and long term—in an atmosphere of improved relations.

For American policymakers faced with this conundrum, the prescription must be to move actively on all fronts. Soviet violations of human rights should be forcefully and publicly condemned. But, at the same time, efforts should proceed apace—on a fully business-like basis—to open every possible door for widened exchange, genuine communication, and enhanced military stability through arms control. This approach should serve not only the American security interest, but also the American interest in human rights.

B. Afghanistan and Its Consequences

Notwithstanding reports that the Soviets may be tiring of their 100,000-man intervention in Afghanistan, the delegation heard no evidence of a Soviet inclination to withdraw. On several occasions, delegation members remonstrated with Soviet officials that the invasion was not only a violation of international law but also a devastating blow to SALT II ratification, which most members of this delegation favored. Delegation members argued that had the Soviets not entered Afghanistan on December 26, 1979, SALT II would have been considered by the full Senate in early 1980 and might well have achieved the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification.

Soviet officials counter with a different interpretation. They claim Soviet forces were dispatched solely to prevent a reactionary overturn of a leftist revolution which had occurred 18 months earlier with little public outcry in the West. As to consequences, they argue that by the end of 1979 it was clear that U.S. policy had undergone a major negative turn and that they had to calculate their options accordingly. As evidence they cite the failure to ratify SALT II during the latter half of that year, the growing political strength of the American political right, national outrage fostered by the Iran hostage crisis, and finally NATO's INF decision of December 12, 1979. Amidst the prevailing climate, they contend, President Carter's only hope for reelection was to shift to a far more conservative policy. Through such tortured reasoning, Soviet officials absolve themselves of any blame for the break-down of arms control at a moment which historians will undoubtedly deem a crucial turning point.

C. The Value of Exchanges

Political exchanges

In discussions with Soviet officials, including Chairman Andropov, delegation members underscored the dangers when political leaders of the superpowers have no first-hand acquaintance with each other or each other's countries. As matters now stand, neither the President, nor three-quarters of the House of Representatives, nor half the Senate has ever been to the Soviet Union. On the Soviet side, the statistics are worse. Yuri Andropov and most other members of the Politburo have not even traveled outside the Communist bloc.

The problem has been compounded as parliamentary and other United States-Soviet exchanges begun in the 1970's became mired in preconditions and political "linkage," yielding the perverse result that exchanges are impeded when most needed. To close this "travel gap," the delegation recommends the establishment of nongovernmental offices in each capital, to facilitate bilateral travel and contact between Soviet and American political leaders. Such a mechanism, which the United States has already established with certain allied countries and with the PRC, would operate regardless of the prevailing international climate and would help to overcome a powerful systemic bias toward mutual ignorance and alienation.

The delegation also supports more direct action, and therefore recommends that the Senate consider extending to all Politburo members a direct invitation to visit the United States for purposes of first-hand contact and very frank discussions.

Scientific and technical exchanges

The period 1972–74 saw the signing of 11 United States-Soviet agreements providing for cooperation in specialized fields of science and technology. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981, activities under most of the agreements were greatly curtailed. In 1982 the Reagan Administration allowed 3 of the 11 to expire, and two others will expire this year unless renewed. By

1983, such exchanges were operating at only 20 percent of 1979 levels.

In 1982, concerned by allegations that scientific and technical exchanges had in any case become a "one-way street" benefitting only the Soviet Union, Congress mandated an Administration study that would identify the benefits from such exchanges, and also assess the risk that militarily significant technology might be inadvertently transferred to the U.S.S.R. The study was prepared by the State Department by compiling assessments from the U.S. agencies responsible for administering the eleven agreements:

Agreement	*Responsible U.S. agency*
1. Agriculture	USDA.
2. Artificial heart research	National Institute of Health.
3. Medical science and public health.	National Institute of Health.
4. Energy (expired 1982)	Department of Energy.
5. Peaceful uses of atomic energy	Department of Energy.
6. Environmental protection	EPA.
7. Housing and other construction	HUD.
8. Scientific and technical cooperation (expired 1982).	Several agencies.
9. Space cooperation (expired 1982)	NASA.
10. Studies of world oceans	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
11. Transportation	Department of Transportation.

Recently submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but as yet unpublished, the formal assessment belies the perception of a one-way flow of benefits. Noting that some agreements have provided the auspices for more than one program, the report specifically identifies six programs under four agreements [3] where the United States tended to benefit more. In three programs under one agreement [4] the Soviet side appeared to benefit more; and in the remaining programs, benefits were assessed as roughly equal. The report also concludes that activities conducted under the agreements "rarely involve the risk of the transfer of militarily significant technology" and that "in those few instances" where such risk has been identified, activities have been either cancelled or appropriately recast.

Noting that the Reagan Administration recently entered into a new, expanded agricultural sales agreement with the Soviet Union, the delegation recommends that scientific and technical agreements which have been allowed to languish or expire be given comparable attention and eventually returned to a full level of cooperative activity. The delegation notes further that any notion of a "one-way street" in such agreements has not only been disproven, but is also largely inappropriate in many areas. Just as the Soviet consumer and the American farmer both benefit from agricultural commerce, so too can both nations continue to gain from the remarkably broad array of cooperative scientific activities they began in the 1970's. It is indeed not only self-defeating but a failure of world responsibility to forgo the humanitarian and ecological achievements that can emanate from scientific and technical cooperation between the two superpowers.

---

[3] Agriculture, Science and Technical Cooperation, Space Cooperation, and Housing.
[4] Medical Science and Public Health.

Educational exchanges

In the area of United States-Soviet educational exchanges, the Administration has not attempted to apply sanctions, and continues to support the Fulbright and IREX academic programs as well as several privately administrated university-to-university exchanges. Soviet support for educational exchanges also continues, under supervision of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. The delegation believes, however, that current levels of exchange are inadequate to bridge the gap of mutual ignorance from which the superpower relationship continues to suffer.

Senate Joint Resolution 133, introduced by Senator Pell, proposes the formal establishment of a United States-Soviet student-exchange-for-peace program, to be directed by a bilateral commission that would oversee the exchange of at least 2,000 participants from each side. The delegation urges implementation of this proposal, with a view to expanding the program as rapidly as possible to a level of 5,000 students and teachers from each side.

Our delegation represented a variety of regions from the U.S.A. and visited a variety of regions in the U.S.S.R. There was great enthusiasm in Tashkent and Tbilisi for more bilateral exchange relations; and the delegation particularly recommends that all future exchanges between the two countries involve as many regions of each country as possible.

D. Arms Control in Space

Chairman Andropov used the occasion of our meeting to announce a new Soviet initiative on anti-satellite weapons (ASATs): "The Soviet Union takes upon itself the commitment not to be the first ones to place in space any types of anti-satellite weapons. In other words, we will introduce a unilateral moratorium on such launches for the entire period of time for the duration of which the other states, including the United States, will refrain from placing in space any type of anti-satellite weapons."

The United States has not had an operating ASAT system since 1975.[5] The new U.S. system using non-nuclear warheads launched by high-flying F-15 aircraft will be substantially more capable than the existing Soviet system.

Since the Soviet system involves a satellite-killer which has been tested and is considered operational, the Soviets may see little need for additional testing in the near future. Accordingly, the unilateral moratorium poses few difficulties for them, while serving the purpose of galvanizing public opinion against tests now planned by the United States of the F-15-based ASAT system.

Chairman Andropov coupled his moratorium concept with a proposal for a new treaty on space-related weapons which entails:

(1) "A complete ban of tests and of deployment of any space-based weapons for striking targets on earth, in the air and in space"; and

---

[5] The United States had a small force of nuclear-tipped ASAT missiles based on Johnston Island in the Pacific from 1964 until retirement in 1975. The ASAT force was retired because the orbiting Soviet nuclear weapons the system was designed to deal with never materialized and because the nuclear warheads on the system would endanger our own satellites as well as Soviet targets.

(2) Agreement "to eliminate anti-satellite systems already in existence and to ban creation of new ones."

Subsequently, Soviet officials provided us with the text of the proposed treaty (see Appendix E). While much of the content appears to be a redraft of a 1981 proposal also submitted at the United Nations, the proposal to dismantle existing ASAT systems and ban new ones appears new. The 1981 proposal dealt only with prohibitions on weapons in space and on destroying, damaging or interfering with space objects of other countries. It did not address testing, development or deployment of ASAT systems.

The new Soviet draft treaty contains provisions which pose significant obstacles to agreement. For instance, it seems obvious that the Soviets intend to try to restrict our very important space shuttle program and its planned use as the primary launch vehicle for defense and intelligence satellites, as well as civilian payloads.

Verification would also be a key issue. A major problem to be addressed would be how to verify dismantling of existing systems since boosters used for other purposes can be used to launch Soviet ASATs. Verifying that new systems were not being tested might be equally difficult. For example, in the case of an aircraft-based system, aircraft used for ASAT purposes might be hard to identify, and small aircraft-based missiles could be hard to detect when deployed or fired.

All told, though, we believe that the Soviet proposal should be treated seriously, for the latest Soviet draft appears to be more forthcoming than previous proposals. Accordingly, we urge that the Adminstration move expeditiously to reopen negotiations on an ASAT ban. Only negotiations will determine whether the Soviets are genuinely interested in banning ASATs and weapons in space. Only through negotiations can we find whether the Soviet Union will agree to a strong and effective verification regime.

Earlier treaties such as the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty have served to prohibit weapons before their deployment in specific zones. The Geneva Protocol and the Environmental Modification Treaty have served to prohibit the use of classes of weapons. There may be an opportunity now to stop ASATs before either side has a significant system deployed and to ban space-based and space-directed weapons in the early stages of man's use of space. If serious and successful negotiation does prove possible, it could pave the way to a resumption of joint United States-Soviet space programs—an eventuality we would welcome in a context of genuinely improved relations.

E. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Clearly, Soviet officials give high priority to forestalling NATO's planned INF deployments, whether through an arms agreement or by political pressure on the Alliance.

At present the negotiating positions remain far apart. The United States has proposed equality of nuclear warheads on longer-range INF missile forces. At present, the United States has no such warheads; it would have 572 warheads with full deployment of 108 Pershing II and 464 cruise missiles. The Soviet Union currently has

a total of 351 SS-20 missiles (243 in Europe; 108 in the Far East) and 250 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, with a total of about 1,300 warheads. Soviet INF proposals have called for reduction of U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft and for inclusion in any agreement of the 144 submarine-launched and 18 land-based ballistic missile warheads (for a total of 162) deployed by the British and the French.

In recent months, the Soviets have offered to reduce their INF missile warheads in Europe to the level of warheads on the 162 missiles possessed by the British and French. However, unlimited new deployments and redeployment of the missiles from Europe to the Far East would be allowed, and all Pershing II and cruise missiles would be prohibited. While we were in the Soviet Union, officials informed us that the Soviet offer had been revised: The Soviet Union is now prepared to dismantle SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s deployed in Europe above the 162 level. This could mean the destruction of about 90 SS-20 missiles and additional SS-4s and SS-5s. Presumably the approximately 100 SS-20 missiles in Asia would be unaffected. Although the proposal appears to clarify Soviet willingness to destroy SS-20s and other missiles, it still fails to recognize that no agreement will be possible that does not deal with the political and military need for U.S. missile deployments to balance Soviet intermediate-range missile forces. In addition, the Soviets are likely to adhere to other elements of their proposal, such as compensation for British and French forces and substantial reductions of U.S. aircraft, which will be obstacles to any agreement.

While we are not in a position to reach judgment on the latest Soviet offer, we urge that the Administration proceed in a careful and positive fashion to ascertain whether the evolving Soviet position helps open the way to a good agreement and, if so, to seize that opportunity.

In the course of our discussions, Soviet officials alternated between protestations that they cannot understand why their proposals to date have been unacceptable and warnings that deployment will bring a Soviet response. Chairman Andropov told the delegation, "Deploying Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe will have its consequences for you as well. Americans will also feel the difference between the situation which existed before the deployment and the situation following it. This is not a threat, but there will be no other path for us to follow. Those are the mutual interrelations peculiar to nuclear weapons." In all subsequent discussions, Soviet officials were reluctant to say precisely what the Soviet response might be.

Time after time, delegation members emphasized to Soviet officials their judgment that the NATO allies will continue to support the planned deployments and that those deployments will commence as scheduled, absent an agreement. Some Soviet officials indicated that they had viewed the original decision to replace single-warhead SS-4s and SS-5s as "really a technical issue," and they seemed to sense that they might have been "mistaken" in that judgment. Nonetheless, they did not seem to understand that the disparity between the intermediate-range missile forces of the two sides, the lack of progress in INF to date, and the imminence of deployment have made it politically and militarily impossible for

the United States and its NATO allies to reverse course, short of a genuine breakthrough in negotiations.

As a result, we concluded, a lack of realistic appreciation of NATO's legitimate concerns and needs may prevent successful conclusion of the negotiations in Geneva, at least until NATO has demonstrated its resolve by commencing deployments. Even then, a Soviet military response may still further diminish prospects for agreement. We hope that our pessimism is not borne out and that both sides will continue to negotiate—and do so seriously. If a changed venue—to a consolidated START/INF negotiation—would be helpful, that should be thoroughly considered.[6]

F. Strategic Arms Reduction

The two sides remain far from agreement in the START talks in Geneva. The Administration is seeking mutual reductions of about one-third in strategic ballistic missile warheads, a sublimit on land-based warheads, and substantial reductions in Soviet medium and heavy missiles. (Recently the Administration relaxed its proposed ceiling on missiles to allow both sides more leeway to develop small single-warhead missiles.) The Soviets have proposed a 20 percent reduction in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles from the SALT II level of 2,250 to 1,800; reductions in warheads and bomber weapons; a freeze on strategic systems while negotiating; a cruise missile ban; and a series of confidence-building measures. The Soviets have also, however, tied their proposals to no U.S. deployments of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.

In our discussion, Chairman Andropov was critical of the U.S. negotiating position. "It is absurd to assume that one could convince or force the other side to break the structure of its strategic forces, to reduce its basic components while leaving complete freedom for one's own hands. This is precisely what the present United States position in the negotiations boils down to. And as long as such an approach is being maintained, it is senseless to demonstrate artificial optimism and to make it appear as if the talks were moving ahead."

Queried whether he would favor consolidation of the START and INF negotiations, Andropov asked why two talks should be merged when the United States doesn't want agreement in either.

Chairman Andropov proposed a freeze on United States and Soviet strategic weapons that would serve to allow "the diplomats to catch up with the weapon builders." He offered two formulas: (1) an agreement involving no increase in the number of available missiles; no development and testing of new types and kinds of strategic arms; and strict limits on the modernization of existing devices; and (2) "a broader version, namely, to freeze all components of nuclear arsenals of the U.S.S.R. and the United States."

Clearly, the Soviets have seen political advantage in supporting a freeze, secure in the knowledge that the Reagan Administration remains adamantly opposed to any freeze concept, whatever its origin. Most members of the delegation believe that the Administration should consider the possibility that an interim mutual and

---

[6] See discussion titled "A Consolidated Nuclear Arms Negotiation."

verifiable freeze could arrest the technological momentum of the arms race and gain time for a successful agreement on reductions.

A number of Soviet officials complained that they are seriously trying to devise arms control solutions to the problems facing the two sides but are not being taken seriously in the negotiations. Said one: "We haven't heard a single good word from Washington" even though we have made "one proposal after another."

Much has been made of the propaganda content of Soviet arms control proposals, and propaganda value was clearly behind much of what we heard in Moscow. At the same time, the United States must deal carefully with serious Soviet proposals if we are to have any hope of achieving meaningful agreement in arms control. Each side should reach judgment on the other side's initiatives only after study and reflection. If opportunities for arms control are lost in a pointless quest for propaganda points, both sides will suffer the consequences.

A wiser approach would be to follow the example of President Kennedy who, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, seized on the positive—rather than the unacceptable—aspects of the Soviet position and built toward a successful resolution.

G. A Consolidated Nuclear Arms Negotiation

In meeting with Chairman Andropov and other Soviet officials, several members of the delegation expressed interest in the possibility of combining the current START and INF negotiations. They asked whether such a move might not reduce, or eliminate, some of the serious political, military and technical issues which are impeding progress toward agreements in Geneva.

The Soviet reaction, while not completely negative to this concept, was generally unreceptive. However, it appears that Soviet responses were motivated less by deep-seated opposition than by a desire to criticize what they termed the Reagan Administration's inflexibility and lack of interest in agreement.

While recognizing that the idea of merging START and INF needs careful study by arms control, military and diplomatic experts, members of the delegation remain convinced that this step will eventually have to be taken. The current negotiating structure is less the result of systematic analysis of the most advantageous method of reaching stabilizing agreements than the accidents of recent political developments within NATO and between NATO and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the delegation urges the United States and the Soviet Union to begin careful study of how the negotiations might be combined, what the objectives of such a negotiation might be, and what long-term political, strategic and negotiating implications could result.

H. Nuclear Test Bans

In discussions of arms control, Soviet officials make much of the fact that three major treaties remain signed but not ratified by the United States: SALT II, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976.

Last year, the Administration decided to seek expanded verification provisions in the protocols to the TTBT and PNET to help re-

solve questions about Soviet compliance. After months of internal debate, Administration officials settled upon the provisions they wanted, and early this year notified the Soviets that the United States wanted to renegotiate the verification provisions of these agreements. The Soviets refused, saying uncertainties would not have occurred if the verification provisions established by the treaties had been put into effect.

The two sides are thus at a needless and pointless impasse. To get test ban efforts back on track, we believe the Administration should:

Submit the TTBT and PNET to the Senate for consent to ratification.

Reserve the right to seek expanded verification, if necessary, subsequently through separate negotiation.

Resume efforts immediately to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

The reasons for such action are compelling. First, the United States and the Soviet Union have considered themselves limited by the 150-kiloton ceiling established by the TTBT since 1976; there has not been, nor is there likely to be, any military requirement to test at a higher level. Second, formalization of the TTBT limits will continue to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting its substantially greater opportunities, because of the location of its test sites, to conduct high yield tests. Third, ratification would codify important precedent-setting verification provisions, including on-site inspection in the PNET. Fourth, ratification of the two treaties would set the stage for conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. In negotiations by the previous Administration, major progress was made toward agreement on a regime which would have included both the placement of stations on Soviet and U.S. soil and also on-site inspection upon demand. The United States should welcome such significant steps forward in verification.

Finally, we must not be blind to the fact that the world could easily turn away from the presently fragile non-proliferation regime. Nothing can undermine that regime so much as continued failure to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions.

I. Chemical and Biological Weapons

Two critically important issues involving chemical and biological weapons were raised by the delegation in discussions:

Possible Soviet violations of existing international constraints on chemical and biological weapons;

Prospects for an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons development, production and stockpiling (including strict and verifiable provisions for the destruction of existing stocks and production facilities).

Evidence has mounted that the Soviets and their allies have used toxins and chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan in violation of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention. Underlying these suspicions is the so-called Sverdlovsk incident in 1979, in which reports indicate over 200 persons may have died of pulmonary anthrax in an accident at a suspected biological weapons laboratory.

In 1980, in the aftermath of Sverdlovsk, bilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, which had commenced in 1976, broke down and have not resumed. As a result, discussions between the sides both on violations and on possibilities for verifiable ban on chemical weapons have been limited and sporadic.

When we raised the violations questions, we received nonspecific and possibly hedged disclaimers. Soviet officials said that international investigators had concluded that there was no proof. As a matter of fact, investigations to date have in no way exonerated the Soviets, who have acted consistently to block investigative experts.

One official told us that the use of chemicals and toxins would be "senseless and without purpose." Another said such use could not be approved by an officer in the field, but only by the Politburo. Although these officials stated they had no personal knowledge of such activities, basic questions remain unresolved.

At present, a chemical weapons ban is under discussion at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The key issue is how to verify compliance. Last year, the Soviets indicated that they would agree to "systematic international on-site inspection."

We emphasized to Soviet officials that the Senate had recently decided, with reluctance, to resume chemical weapons production in 1985. We pointed out that the vote was heavily influenced by failure to make progress toward a ban and by evidence that the Soviets and their allies have used chemical toxins. We underscored the fact that, once production of binary weapons begins, the problems of verification would multiply and complicate still further the problems of achieving an agreement.

Unless both sides move to resolve differences, the United States and the Soviet Union will continue on a course that will increase both the horror and danger of chemical warfare. Unlike nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are both simple and cheap to make. If the superpowers fail to ban chemical weapons, such weapons will inevitably be acquired by nations around the world, and prospects for their use will burgeon.

Accordingly, we urge that the Administration press the Soviets on the question of biological weapons production and stockpiling. If the Soviets are not so engaged, Chairman Andropov should be called upon to say so and to take immediate steps to resolve fully all questions that have arisen. At the same time, the Administration should press hard for an immediate resumption of bilateral negotiations. The Soviets should be put to the test of devising a scheme of on-site inspection upon demand that will meet tough verification standards.

J. Confidence-Building Measures

The development of confidence-building measures to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident or miscalculation is one of the few promising areas of United States-Soviet cooperation. Shortly before our visit, the Administration sent an interagency group to Moscow for talks on improved communication links—specifically, an upgraded hotline for the use of the leaders, emergency lines between

the military on each side, and better communication between each capital and its embassy.

The United States has also told the Soviet Union it would like to pursue an international agreement on consultation in the event of a terrorist nuclear incident. In the START and INF negotiations each side has also set forth proposals designed to improve confidence. The United States is seeking (a) agreement on advance notice of all ICBM and SLBM launches and major military exercises, and (b) a data exchange on strategic nuclear forces. The Soviets have proposed measures (a) restricting heavy bomber and aircraft carrier movements, (b) establishing SLBM sanctuaries, and (c) providing for advance notification of mass takeoff of heavy bombers and forward-based aircraft.

We encourage prompt agreement in those areas where differences can be resolved. At the same time, we offer a caveat. Agreement in these areas cannot substitute for agreements which limit and reduce specific armaments. Confidence-building measures can be crucially important in reinforcing an arms control regime, but they will be no more than peripheral achievements if the two sides continue to fritter away precious time in the major arms control negotiations.

K. Arms Control Verification and Compliance

In discussion with Chairman Andropov and other senior Soviet officials, the delegation stressed the political and security importance to the United States of Soviet respect for its arms control commitments. The delegation set as a major objective of its visit to convey to Soviet leaders the growing concern in the Senate about reports of Soviet activities which might be inconsistent with some current arms control agreements.

The general exchange of views with Chairman Andropov left little time for a detailed explanation of our interest in improved verification methods and our concerns about compliance matters. Pressed three times, Chairman Andropov stated that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to do whatever is necessary to ensure that agreements are verifiable, although, pointing to the lack of progress in START and INF talks, he said we must first have something to verify. The delegation assumes Chairman Andropov's statement indicates a Soviet willingness in ongoing and potential arms negotiations to consider seriously verification measures going beyond national technical means.

The delegation left with Chairman Andropov a statement by Senator Leahy (see Appendix C) setting forth its concerns about Soviet activities relating to existing formal and informal arms agreements. The purpose of the statement—and of elaborations of it in subsequent meetings—was to ensure that the Soviet leadership understands that if compliance issues remain unresolved, the basis of support for arms control in the Senate will be undermined. The delegation wished Soviet leaders to comprehend this reality as United States and Soviet verification experts prepare to meet in the SALT Standing Consultative Commission to discuss these issues. Delegation members stressed the critical importance of satisfactory Soviet responses.

The Soviets insisted that the U.S.S.R. has committed no violations of its arms control obligations, and that all significant provisions of existing agreements are adequately verifiable. Soviet officials said that the Soviet Union would never sign an agreement which it would have to violate to maintain its security, nor would it risk the international repercussions of violating "trifling" provisions. In a centralized state such as the Soviet Union, the Soviets emphasized, deliberate violations by lower military officials could never occur.

In the Soviet view, there is a deliberate campaign underway in the United States to destroy the arms control framework created over the past 15 years. Soviet officials asserted that President Reagan's abortive plan to deploy the MX missile in the Closely Spaced Basing or "Dense Pack" mode would have been the only clear-cut violation of SALT II committed by either side. As for the ABM Treaty, they claimed the President's speech of March 23, 1983, concerning development and deployment of space-based anti-ballistic weapons, indicated an American willingness tc violate that agreement.

When the delegation pressed the seriousness of American concerns, especially about the testing of two new Soviet ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the PL-5), Soviet officials stated that a "reasonable" response would be given when "reasonable" U.S. questions were formally presented to the Soviet Union. The Soviets also denied that a newly discovered phased array radar violates the ABM Treaty. They did state that this matter should be clarified in the appropriate forum.

Throughout the meetings with Chairman Andropov and other Soviet officials, all members of the delegation emphasized that they hoped Soviet leaders would comprehend that concern about unexplained Soviet activities extended across ideological and party lines, including committed supporters of arms control as well as sceptics. Soviet refusal to provide adequate explanations would obviously jeopardize future arms control agreements serving the interests of both countries.

The delegation underlined the special responsibility of the Senate to advise and consent to ratification of arms control treaties. The members stated repeatedly their belief that unless current agreements were respected, and unless the Soviet Union genuinely accepts the necessity of adequate verification arrangements, including measures beyond national technical means where necessary, the Senate would refuse to approve any new arms treaty, regardless of who was President or which party was in power.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

We left the Soviet Union with a deepened sense that the two superpowers are doing little in a practical sense to halt the downward spiral of their relationship. Neither side has yet advanced a proposal for nuclear arms control which the other side is willing to take seriously. The Soviets are unmoved by Western concerns about the treatment of Poland and the occupation of Afghanistan, and still view as a solely internal matter their systematic abuses of the Helsinki Final Act, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

It became clear in the course of our visit that many Soviet leaders sincerely believe that the U.S. Government has no interest in better relations with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets conclude that they simply cannot work with the United States, it is reasonable to expect a deepening of United States-Soviet hostility, intensified internal repression in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, and possibly even a collapse of the few remaining restraints on the arms race.

We do not conclude that the relationship has deteriorated beyond repair, and there is some evidence that leaders on both sides recognize the dangers of a return to unbridled Cold War. Arms control negotiations continue and may yet have a productive result. Both sides continue to participate in the CSCE framework and recently reached agreement at the Madrid Review Conference on a new program of arms control and human rights contacts. Commercial deals—such as the recent grain agreement—continue to be made. Other signs show at least a limited ability to cooperate.

Several members of the delegation urged that a United States-Soviet summit be held soon to increase mutual understanding, improve poor communication between the two countries, and generally ease tensions. Each superpower possesses the capability to destroy the other—and incidentally world civilization. And yet the leaders who preside over these forces have not met each other and have not seen the nation their terrible weaponry would carry to sudden and lasting oblivion.

The dangers of miscalculation were underscored immediately upon our return by the horrible loss of the Korean airliner. Nothing—save a still larger tragedy—could better have demonstrated that, despite all its sophistication, modern military power can be used rashly and in an entirely self-defeating way. In the hideous waste of life and the setback to East-West relations the world has lost greatly.

The United States should not stint in joining a full-scale international condemnation of this Soviet assault on civilized behavior. The world community must bring home to the Soviet Union that

such barbarous conduct will not be tolerated. At the same time that his lesson is clearly made, we support two statements by President Reagan in his speech concerning subsequent U.S. policy toward the Soviets: "we must not give up our effort to bring them into the world community of nations" and "we cannot, we must not, give up our effort to reduce the arsenals of destructive weapons threatening the world."

Today the superpowers have before them an arms control agenda that is not only full but ominous in the implications if they fail. It includes negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range arms, on space-related weapons, on chemical and biological warfare, on nuclear test bans, and on an array of confidence-building measures. Since arms control is not a zero-sum game, it is possible in each of these areas to envisage arms agreements which would enhance both United States security and Soviet security simultaneously. Accordingly, it continues to be in the American national interest to put the Soviets to the test of accepting reasonable terms and verification procedures on the full spectrum of arms control issues.

The Korean airlines massacre underscores the necessity for a clear perception of U.S. national interests. The Soviet Union exists today as it did before this outrage—a potent adversary with which we must deal shrewdly and dispassionately. We must continue to shape our national defense according to the merits of the programs. And we must continue efforts to tame the nuclear threat through tough and determined negotiations. Notwithstanding their fundamental differences, the two superpowers should focus where possible on areas of potential agreement—not only to serve their common interests, which are profound, but also to fulfill their solemn responsibilities to the world.

V. APPENDIXES

A. Statement by Chairman Andropov (Kremlin, Aug. 18, 1983)

Esteemed Senators: I am happy to welcome you. I hope your stay in the Soviet Union, even though brief, will be interesting and useful.

I would like to express my apologies with regard to the fact that it was necessary to change the date of our meeting and thereby cause certain inconveniences to you. But circumstances are at times more powerful than we are. What is important is that we did meet. And if this is so, then let us go over to business.

1. I am proceeding on the premise that you came here for serious talks about Soviet-American relations, that you are concerned about their present state. It concerns us, too. Thus, presumably, we do have a topic for conversation.

The fact that representatives of one political party—in this case the Democratic party—are present here is in principle of no significance to us. Do not take me wrong. We see you as responsible public figures of the United States of America having an influence on the formation of policy.

Everything I will say to you I would say to Republican Senators.

I shall begin by saying that the tension which is at this time characteristic of practically all areas of our relations is not our choice. The United States side's rationale in this is possibly clearer to you.

There may be someone in Washington who believes that in circumstances of tension, in a "game without rules," it will be easier to achieve one's objectives. I do not think so. In the grand scheme of things it is not so at all. It will not work for one side to be the dominant one. Would the United States permit someone to achieve superiority over them? I doubt it. And this is why we would not tolerate it either.

Our policy with respect to the United States of America is directed at achieving a level of accord which would ensure normal, stable and good relations contributing to mutual advantages of both sides and to the great benefit of world peace. That, of course, presupposes mutual readiness to do business on an equal basis, to have consideration for each other's legitimate interests.

2. What was said above is also completely true of the issue of nuclear arms in Europe. Your and our ability to find a solution here acceptable to both sides, to stop a most dangerous new round in the arms race in this region, that is to say along our borders, will determine where you and we will go from here.

It appears to us that in the United States they do not fully realize how much is at stake here. Maybe they feel it is not so terribly

important what will take place as long as it would happen thousands of kilometers away from the United States.

It is wrong to think that way. Deploying "Pershings" and cruise missiles in Europe will have its consequences for you as well. Americans will also feel the difference between the situation which existed before the deployment and the situation following it. This is not a threat, but there will be no other path for us to follow. Those are the mutual interrelations peculiar to nuclear weapons.

What does the Soviet Union propose? We propose a balance at maximally low levels, that is, equality on the way to radical reductions, and not by means of a nuclear arms build-up. The best thing of all—and that is our first choice—is to agree that neither the U.S.S.R. nor NATO should have any nuclear arms in Europe at all, neither medium range nor tactical.

What is so unfair about it? To refuse such a proposal is a possibility only for those who are precisely against equal levels, including true zero levels, and who count on stashing away for themselves a nice piece "for later."

As long as the United States, however, did not wish to even talk about this version, we presented a number of other constructive proposals at the negotiations. I will not expound on all of them. I hope you are familiar with them. By way of summarizing all of these proposals, I would merely like to underscore the following: if these proposals were carried out, the total number of medium range nuclear devices in Europe, both on the U.S.S.R. side and on the side of NATO, would be reduced to one third. In this case on the part of NATO only, aviation devices would be reduced while on the Soviet side also missiles would be reduced, including a significant number of SS-20 missiles.

As a result, the Soviet Union would be left with considerably fewer missiles and warheads on them than it had in 1976, when no one considered us to have superiority in this category of weapons.

Why then is this unacceptable to the United States?

As you see, we show great flexibility in our search for mutually acceptable solutions and believe that, should the United States show interest in an honest understanding on an equal basis, success in Geneva would still be possible. But our flexibility has its limits: they are dictated by security interests of the Soviet Union, security interests of our allies. We do not recommend anyone to count on unilateral concessions on our part at a detriment to these interests. There will be none even 5 minutes prior to the deployment of new U.S. missiles, should the United States nevertheless insist on it.

3. Our countries are conducting negotiations on strategic weapons as well. If you and we do not come to an agreement on this matter, tomorrow there will appear new, more refined and dreadful weapons systems which will raise the level of nuclear confrontation, will exacerbate the strategic situation. Such systems are already rolling forward. All this should be plain to you.

If the United States side actually wishes to have an understanding on this matter, then it should not be presented as if one type of bombs and missiles were fearsome, while some others are fully acceptable; as if one could live peacefully with one type and could not do so with another. Such a premise is basically incorrect. It is

absurd to assume that one could convince or force the other side to break the structure of its strategic forces, to reduce its basic components while leaving complete freedom for one's own hands. This is precisely what the present U.S. position in the negotiations boils down to. And as long as such an approach is being maintained, it is senseless to demonstrate artificial optimism and to make it appear as if the talks were moving ahead.

This question, too, could be solved only on an equal basis. If no such decision is reached, further strategic arms race and increased threat of nuclear war are inevitable. We in the Soviet Union are against it.

4. A good prerequisite for finding a solution would be to freeze United States and Soviet strategic weapons. Because it is really true that military technology is developing faster than the negotiations on its limitation. And, as a result of this, we are running the risk of discussing problems of yesterday at the negotiations. A "freeze" would create proper conditions for the diplomats to catch up with the weapons builders. We propose not only not to increase the number of available missiles, but to forego the development and testing of new types and kinds of strategic arms and also to limit maximally the modernization of the existing devices.

We would agree also to a broader version, namely to freezing all components of nuclear arsenals of the U.S.S.R. and the United States. This would serve as an example for the other countries.

A freeze would immediately stop the dangerous process of an unrestrained nuclear arms race, and that is the dream of all peoples. A totally different political atmosphere would be created, an atmosphere in which it would be much easier to agree on reducing the stockpiles of such weapons.

In the United States they sometimes say that a freeze would supposedly "consolidate" the advantages the U.S.S.R. is supposed to have in this area. I seem to remember, however, that not so long ago at hearings in Congress your generals were directly asked whether the United States would agree to exchange their nuclear arsenal for that of the U.S.S.R. The generals gave a clearly negative reply. Why then, one would like to know, do they not wish to acquire for themselves our "advantages"?!

An appeal for the freeze originates not only with us. This idea has been discussed in various countries for a long time. As I understand it, it is not alien to political circles in the United States either.

5. Regrettably another severe danger has appeared these days, which is lurking over the human race: the danger of the arms race spreading into space. It is not enough to have our planet oversaturated with nuclear and other arms as it is, they want to stuff outer space with it. Today it appears that not everyone is aware of the consequences of that. But tomorrow it may be too late.

Such a development of events must be prevented. As far as I know there is concern about this matter among the U.S. legislators as well; the view is being expressed that there is no need to follow the path of creating anti-satellite weapons and an anti-ballistic defense system utilizing space for this purpose.

It was not long ago that I had to state that we stand for banning the use of force in general, not only in space itself, but from space to Earth as well and also from Earth to space.

At this point I would like to tell you in greater detail what, as we see it, can and should be done in order to prevent the militarization of space, to remove this new threat endangering humanity.

First of all the Soviet Union considers it necessary to come to an agreement on a complete ban of tests and of deployment of any space-based weapons for striking targets on Earth, in the air and in space.

Furthermore, we are ready, in the most radical way, to resolve the issue of anti-satellite weapons—to agree to eliminate anti-satellite systems already in existence and to ban creation of new ones.

At the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, we will introduce proposals developed in detail on all these issues.

But that is not all. I can let you be the first to know that we made an exceptionally important resolution. The Soviet Union takes upon itself the commitment not to be the first ones to place in space any types of anti-satellite weapons. In other words, we will introduce a unilateral moratorium on such launches for the entire period of time for the duration of which the other states, including the United States, will refrain from placing in space any type of anti-satellite weapons.

Here you have another specific example of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union, its determination to strengthen in actual fact the peace and security of the peoples.

One would like to count on the United States to come up with a positive reaction on this our new initiative.

6. I would like to dwell briefly on several other issues.

One has the impression that it has become the rule in U.S. policy to explain away nearly every international problem, without much further ado, as "Communist plotting," or even simply "Moscow intrigues," and to act accordingly.

Such a policy certainly produces its results. But, what sort of results? It multiplies the number of conflict situations, leads them to a potentially explosive state.

Let us take Central America. The reasons for what is happening there are deep-seated—of course, you know them as well as I do. The problem cannot be solved by a threat to use arms, by conducting provocative military demonstrations, by outside interference in the internal affairs of states. This can only make the situation more acute and dangerous.

We are deeply convinced that only political settlement can help here. The efforts of the Latin American countries which strive to help find mutually acceptable solutions to problems of this region are assessed by us according to their merits. Settlement principles advanced by Nicaragua and Cuba create, as we see it, a good basis for reaching an understanding without prejudice to anyone's interests or prestige.

One should do everything in order that the circumstances in Central America and around it not go out of control. This is urgently needed in the interests of the people of that region, in the broad interests of international security.

And, in international issues, be it in the Near East, in South-East Asia, in Africa, or anywhere else, we favor, in general, assigning first priority to the task of lowering tensions, preventing conflicts and resolving them by peaceful means, where they arise.

7. Our esteemed guests, if you followed the events in our country to some extent, you probably know that at this time our people, under the guidance of its Communist Party, is engaged in the extensive and difficult task of raising the efficiency of the functioning of our entire economy, of its management level, of achieving new levels in scientific and technical progress. Many millions of Soviet people are actively engaged in this great work in different ways. Our plans of peaceful construction have been worked out for many years ahead. And they have only one ultimate purpose: to improve the life of the people, raising its material and spiritual level.

It is therefore logical that in the area of foreign policy we see our main objective in strengthening peace and international security, in securing a peaceful life for our peoples first and foremost by eliminating the threat of nuclear warfare. Let us act in a persistent and stable manner in this respect. We are open to fruitful mutually advantageous cooperation, interaction with all states including your country.

However complex the situation of the world today, we look ahead with optimism, with assurance that common sense and reason will set the world on the right way. And the normalization of relations between our two countries must by all means become one of the most important ingredients of this process.

I would probably be a bad Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. if I did not add that we champion a broad development of various forms of parliamentary contacts with other countries including the United States of America. It is an important element of strengthening mutual understanding and peace among peoples. In this sense we welcome your visit, as well, to the Soviet Union, gentlemen. I hope your stay in Moscow, Leningrad, Uzbekistan and Georgia helps you better understand and feel the way of life and thinking of the Soviet people.

B. Opening Statement by Senator Pell (Kremlin, Aug. 18, 1983)

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I are deeply grateful for this opportunity to meet with you to exchange views. In preparing for this trip, I conferred with our friends and fellow Democrats Averell and Pamela Harriman, whom you saw recently and who asked that we extend their warmest regards.

There is no secret, Mr. Chairman, that we meet at a time of great difficulty in the relationship between our nations. Nearly 150 years ago, that perceptive Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville predicted that your country and ours were destined to rise to dominance in the world. He expressed optimism, however, that war between us was improbable because Russia is a bear and America a whale—two animals unable to quarrel or even to get at each other. Unfortunately, the nuclear age ruined de Tocqueville's metaphor: our nations have indeed ascended in power, but history and technology have reduced us to scorpions in a bottle. Recognizing that

unhappy reality, Mr. Chairman, this delegation has arrived in the Soviet Union with three constructive purposes.

First, as American political representatives we wish to learn more about your country—not only about its policies but also about its perspectives and people. Our nations are in many ways deep-seated adversaries and each busily allocates billions in rubles or dollars to arming against the other. Yet we devote much less energy to the search for genuine mutual understanding. We have taken some small strides, though not nearly enough, in the area of cultural and academic exchange. But it is the national leadership on each side that may determine man's fate. And in the realm of political leaders, our efforts to educate ourselves about one another is not only inadequate but dangerously negligent.

I must estimate the statistics on your side, Mr. Chairman, but I know them on mine. In the Senate, which is solely responsible for the ratification of treaties, it was not until we arrived yesterday that half our members had even been to the Soviet Union; the number is now exactly 50 out of 100. In the House of Representatives, where each Congressman serves an electorate of one-half million citizens, only one-fourth of America has a representative who has visited this country.

Travel, of course, is only one source of knowledge; but it provides a form of insight and memory like no other. I, for example, still recall an experience some 25 years ago when I found myself on a train to Moscow—without, alas, any cash. Fortunately, I was looked after by my Russian fellow passengers who, with spontaneous hospitality, fed me for the whole journey. I am sure they contributed in some measure to my subsequent support for a policy of relaxing tensions between our two nations—that is, détente.

I remember, too, coming here with my fellow Democratic Senator Albert Gore on the eve of détente—the date was November 1968. We met with Premier Kosygin, who spoke of the "hawk versus dove" rivalry that besets your system as it does ours. We agreed, I recall vividly, on the need for American and Soviet political leaders to imbue their respective bureaucracies with an acceptance of nuclear "sufficiency" as opposed to "superiority." This was obviously a revolutionary idea whose time had come. And although that idea has not yet prevailed, I continue to believe that its best hope for success lies in increased contact between political—and military—leaders of our two countries.

In that context, Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer a personal view concerning the question of a United States-Soviet summit. I am aware that both governments have declared that a summit should occur only if "well prepared," meaning that a significant agreement must be codified by the two leaders. But I cannot find in this mutual position a persuasive logic. For it is in periods of United States-Soviet tension, when bilateral agreements are least likely, that our mutual jeopardy—and thus our need for communication—are greatest. Representing a potential Armageddon, thousands of Soviet and American missiles of unimaginable destructive power are today counterpoised on a hair trigger. And yet the men who preside over those forces—Chairman Andropov and President Reagan—have not met each other and lack even minimal personal acquaintance with the country their terrible weaponry could carry

to sudden and lasting oblivion. To most citizens of the world—whatever the diplomatic rationale—that is a situation which defies common sense. Formal agreements are important. But to the degree that our leaders know and understand one another, agreements become less important—and also, incidentally, much more probable.

The second purpose of our visit, Mr. Chairman, is to convey to you and your colleagues an American perspective—in person and outside of normal diplomatic channels. We feel this is important not only because personal contact is valuable in itself, especially at a time when diplomatic communication is limited, but also because we are a group of Democratic Senators who represent the "loyal opposition" in our political system. In various ways and degrees, each of us disagrees with the present Administration. But we want you to know that, in certain areas pertaining to United States-Soviet relations, a broad consensus of opinion extends across the entire American political spectrum:

We want you to know that the American people—even those, like myself, who have consistently supported improved East-West relations—are seriously worried by the Soviet military build-up. In the Congress, we have wide-ranging debates about how—and how much—the United States should respond. But it is an undeniable fact that Soviet armament over the last 15 years—at a pace much in excess of our own—is a major source of American concern, and the principal factor fueling a number of our new weapons programs. This includes the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe.

We want you to know also that the American people are deeply concerned about Soviet intervention—direct and indirect—in Afghanistan, Poland, Southeast Asia, southern Africa, and Central America. In the Soviet view, détente was apparently compatible with an unrestrained competition for influence around the world. But the past decade has shown a conflicting truth: as much as they may desire genuine United States-Soviet détente, the American people will not sustain such a policy when they perceive the Soviet Union to be engaged, through proxies and otherwise, in activities of global adventure and expansion. Nothing demonstrates this better than Afghanistan, where the Soviet invasion—and the American public reaction—made Senate approval of SALT II a political impossibility.

And we want you to know, too, that the American people are sincerely distressed by what they perceive, in the Soviet Union, as a continued, and in some respects increased, suppression of human rights. You may regard such an American statement as an intrusion on Soviet sovereignty. But the Helsinki Final Act, to which both our nations pledged adherence, underscores human rights as a legitimate international concern. As leaders representing 9 of our 50 States, we feel compelled to tell you of the compassion in America for those—many of them Jews—who seek to emigrate and cannot; for those who have pleaded publicly for peace and for Soviet adherence to the Helsinki agreement, and who have been persecuted or jailed; and for individuals such as Andrei Sakharov, Raoul Wallenberg, Yuri Orlov, and Anatoly Shcharansky, whose names are now widely known among our people. It is my delega-

tion's view, Mr. Chairman, that our discussion today would not fulfill its constructive potential if we failed to emphasize this subject. Accordingly, we wish to leave you certain letters, and we urge your serious consideration of their content. It is our earnest conviction that these matters bear heavily on the prospect for improved United States-Soviet relations, and it is in that spirit that we act.

This brings me, Mr. Chairman, to the third purpose of our visit, which is to explore with you and your countrymen areas of potential progress. As a legislative delegation, we cannot negotiate. But it is also clear that on most fronts today United States-Soviet negotiations are inhibited by mutual antagonism—and also, perhaps, by a good deal of bureaucratic in-fighting on each side. In such circumstances, we see value in an open discussion which looks to the "big picture," and entertains new concepts, instead of focusing on the details of current negotiating positions.

In that regard I can recall a brief conversation I had in the mid-1970's with your predecessor, Mr. Brezhnev, to whom I took the opportunity to emphasize the urgency of United States and Soviet leadership in the area of global environmental protection. I have reason to believe that our discussion, which by-passed routine channels of diplomacy, motivated the process that culminated not long thereafter in the signing of the multilateral Environmental Modification Treaty. With hope of similar progress, Mr. Chairman, may I call your attention to a related measure—an unsigned Environmental Assessment Treaty, currently languishing at U.N. Evironmental Program Headquarters in Nairobi.

For discussion today, Mr. Chairman, my colleagues and I have developed a limited number of subjects and questions which we hope will engage your interest in an atmosphere of constructive exchange. These ideas include, for example, the possibility of consolidating the START and INF negotiations by way of seeking a common overall warhead limit covering both intermediate-range and intercontinental weaponry. We also wish to hear your views on the idea of an immediate cessation by both our countries of all underground nuclear testing, and the reopening of negotiations toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. Relatedly, we have interest in the concept of a joint U.S.-Soviet moratorium on anti-satellite testing, a step that would be followed by negotiation of a ban on anti-satellite weapons, a treaty banning weapons in space, and new cooperative ventures in space. Still another area for exploration is the obvious need, to which I referred earlier, for a mechanism affording our leaders regular contacts in a context free of the pressures and demands of the summit.

With your permission, I would begin the discussion and then, after you have responded and as time allows, I would ask my colleagues to raise additional subjects for your consideration and responses.

C. Statement by Senator Leahy (Kremlin, Aug. 18, 1983)

Mr. Chairman, I have come to Moscow for one overriding purpose: to underline my deep and growing concern that the arms control process is in jeopardy.

Perhaps you know that my colleagues and I are strong advocates of verifiable arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union. I supported the SALT II Treaty, and I earnestly hope the Geneva negotiations will soon lead to equitable agreements.

However, in all frankness, I must tell you that questionable Soviet activity regarding existing formal and informal arms agreements is causing me increasing concern. Although there are important issues relating to the possible use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, my main concerns at this meeting are about the unratified SALT II Treaty which both sides say they will observe, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

I am worried by reports that the Soviet Union is testing two new intercontinental ballistic missiles, when the SALT II Treaty permits only one. Perhaps even more worrisome for the future of verifiable arms control is the level of encryption of telemetry from Soviet strategic missile tests. Access to telemetry is necessary to verify compliance with important provisions of SALT II, as well as any future treaty with qualitative limitations. Recently, there have also been press reports of the construction in the Soviet Union of a large phased array radar in a location which could be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to debate these matters. My intention is to explain to you the widening distress among all Members of the United States Senate, Republican and Democrat, regarding your country's activities. Arms control supporters like myself can't defend the arms control process when Soviet behavior raises legitimate questions which remain unanswered.

Not only may the political basis for American observance of SALT II thus be weakened, a climate is being created which will make Senate approval of any future arms agreement much more difficult. For the United States to ratify any treaty, two-thirds of the 100 Senators must agree. Whether they do or not will depend mainly on the past Soviet arms control record.

There may be valid explanations for all these activities. As one who firmly believes mutual, verifiable arms reductions and limitations are good for both our countries, I urge you to resolve our concerns. This would immeasurably strengthen those in the United States who are convinced that arms control can reduce the terrible threat to our peoples of a nuclear catastrophe.

D. Delegation Press Conference Statement (Spaso House, Aug. 18, 1983)

Ladies and gentlemen: This afternoon this delegation of nine [1] Democratic Senators met for 2 hours in the Kremlin with the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Chairman Andropov delivered a prepared statement of some length; and I delivered a prepared statement on behalf of the delegation. There was then a period of exchange. My prepared statement is available to you here. We have asked for a copy of the Andropov statement, and it may or may not be made available before we leave Moscow.

I believe the meeting was a substantive one, even though many of the views expressed by each side were known to the other. Chairman Andropov had not previously met at such length with American Government officials, and we were pleased to have the opportunity for a personal exchange. Chairman Andropov appeared to be in good health, and he expressed himself with clarity and determination.

Because we are Senators, this group was in no position to negotiate with Chairman Andropov. But we did take the opportunity, as you will see reflected in my prepared statement, to express our views on aspects of Soviet *foreign* policy in various regions of the world and on aspects of Soviet *domestic* policy relating to human rights. On neither subject can it be said that Chairman Andropov responded with positions that are not already well known. On the subject of foreign intervention, for example, Chairman Andropov compared Soviet policy in Afghanistan with U.S. policy toward Nicaragua—an analogy we found highly unpersuasive. With regard to human rights, we detected no sign of a shift in Soviet policy.

In another area—arms control—Chairman Andropov did offer a new initiative, but one which must be placed in very precise perspective. The specific subject was anti-satellite weaponry, and here Chairman Andropov made two statements:

First, he declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to agree to dismantle "existing anti-satellite systems and, further, to agree to ban the development of all "new" anti-satellite weaponry.

Second, he declared that the Soviet Union was now initiating a unilateral moratorium on the launching into space of any anti-satellite weaponry, and he indicated that he would continue this moratorium for so long as the United States reciprocated.

Now, the significance of these two statements must be seen against the background of the existing state of anti-satellite technology, a field in which the Soviets are now ahead of the United States. By itself, the Soviet moratorium offer could mean very little other than a desire to forestall the now-planned tests by which the United States hopes to close the gap. An analogy can be drawn with intermediate-range nuclear weapons, where the Soviets—having deployed 351 SS–20's—have proposed a moratorium which would have the effect of forestalling the planned NATO response.

The moratorium offer would be significant *only* if the Soviets now went *further* and followed it up by demonstrating a serious will to fulfill the goal Chairman Andropov declared first: A negotiated, *verifiable* agreement eliminating all existing and future anti-satellite weaponry. That objective would serve the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and we hope therefore that the moratorium offer is *not a ploy but a prelude* to serious negotiation on these potentially very destabilizing weapons.

It must now fall to the administration to determine whether such a serious negotiation and such an agreement are possible.

---

[1] Senator DeConcini attended with the delegation.

E. Soviet Treaty Proposal Concerning the Non-Militarization of Space (Released Aug. 22, 1983)

(A Letter from Andrei Gromyko, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., to U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar) (Translated by TASS)

Esteemed Mr. Secretary-General, the Soviet Union suggests that the question "On Concluding a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Outer Space with Regard to Earth" be included in the agenda of the 38th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

In tabling this proposal, the U.S.S.R. guides itself by the desire to prevent the militarisation of outer space. A particular danger in this respect is posed by the plans to develop and deploy different systems of space weapons capable of hitting targets both in outer space and on Earth.

The Soviet Union believes it imperative to raise a dependable barrier to the plans to turn outer space into a source of mortal danger to mankind by urgently taking effective measures to prevent the projection of the arms race to where there has so far been none; namely, to outer space.

Guiding itself by this objective, the U.S.S.R. tabled at the United Nations in 1981 a proposal on the conclusion of a Treaty Banning the Deployment of Weapons of Any Type in Outer Space, a proposal approved by the General Assembly. However, work to draw up that treaty has not yet begun in practice because of certain reasons.

Time is not waiting, however, and the U.S.S.R. is now suggesting that a step farther be taken right away and agreement be reached to ban altogether the use of force both in outer space and from outer space with regard to Earth. It is submitting to the session a draft of an appropriate treaty.

An important characteristic of this draft treaty is a combination of politico-legal obligations of states to forgo the use of force against one another in outer space and from outer space, and substantive measures intended to prevent the militarisation of outer space.

Specifically, the Soviet Union stands for banning altogether the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons intended to hit targets on Earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space.

It also stands for the radical solution of the question of anti-satellite weapons, namely, for the complete renunciation by states of the development of new anti-satellite systems and for the elimination of such systems already in their possession.

The participants in the treaty would also undertake not to destroy or damage the space objects of other states nor disrupt their normal functioning or change their flight trajectories in any other way.

In addition, a ban is suggested on the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military purposes, including anti-satellite aims; their use should serve entirely the solution of diverse scientific, technical and economic problems.

The implementation of the complex of far-reaching measures proposed by the Soviet Union would mean a major tangible contribution towards the achievement of the goal approved by the United Nations earlier, that of using outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

I ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, to regard this letter as a memorandum provided for by the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and to release it jointly with the appended text of the draft treaty as an official document of the U.S. General Assembly.

Andrei Gromyko,
First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Draft Treaty [1] on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Outer Space with Regard to Earth

The States parties to the present Treaty,

Guided by the principle whereby the members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations,

---

[1] Unofficial Novosti translation.

Determined to prevent an arms race in outer space and thereby reduce the danger of nuclear war threatening humanity,

Wishing to make their contribution towards the achievement the situation where the exploration and exploitation of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would be conducted for peaceful ends only,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

It shall hereby be prohibited to resort to the use of force or the threat thereof in outer space, in the air space and on the Earth, involving the use to that end of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or placed in outer space in any manner whatsoever as means of destruction.

It shall likewise be prohibited to resort to the use of force or the threat thereof in relation to the space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies, or placed in outer space in any manner whatsoever.

ARTICLE 2

In accordance with the provisions of Article 1, the States parties to the present Treaty shall undertake:

1. Not to test and not to deploy, by putting in orbit around the Earth, placing on celestial bodies or otherwise, any space-based weapon designed to hit targets on the Earth, in the air and outer space.

2. Not to use space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or placed in outer space in any other manner whatsoever, as means of destruction of any target on the Earth, in the air and in the outer space.

3. Not to destroy, nor damage, nor disturb the normal functioning or modify the trajectory of the flight of space objects of other States.

4. Not to test, nor create new counter-satellite systems, and scrap whatever systems of this kind they already have.

5. Not to test, nor use, for military, including counter-satellite, ends, any manned spaceships.

ARTICLE 3

The countries-participants in this treaty agree not to help, encourage or urge any countries or groups of countries, international organizations or natural and juridical persons to activities banned by the present treaty.

ARTICLE 4

1. To insure confidence in the observance of the provisions of this treaty, each member-state uses the available national technical control facilities in a way corresponding to the generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each country-participant in the treaty pledges not to interfere with the national technical control facilities of the other member-states performing their functions in accordance with item 1 of the present Article.

ARTICLE 5

1. The countries-participants in the present treaty pledge to consult and cooperate with one another in the settlement of all questions that may arise with respect to the objectives of the treaty or in connection with the implementation of its provisions.

2. Consultations and cooperation in accordance with item 1 of the present Article may also be undertaken by using the relevant international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in keeping with its Charter. These procedures may include the use of the services of the Consultative Committee of the countries-participants in the treaty.

3. The Consultative Committee of the countries-participants in the treaty is convened by the depositary within a month after receiving the appropriate request from any country participating in this treaty. Any member-state may appoint a representative to the committee.

ARTICLE 6

Each member-state of this treaty pledges to take any internal measures it deems necessary in accordance with its constitutional procedures to ban and prevent any

activities contradicting the provisions of this treaty, under its jurisdiction or under its control wherever it may be.

ARTICLE 7

Nothing in the present Treaty affects the rights and duties of states under the U.N. Charter.

ARTICLE 8

All the disputes that may arise in connection with the present Treaty will be settled exclusively by peaceful means with the use of procedures envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 9

The present Treaty is permanent.

ARTICLE 10

1. The present Treaty is open for signing to all states in the United Nations' main bodies in New York. States that fail to sign this Treaty before it takes effect in accordance with Point 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. The present Treaty shall be ratified by the states that have signed it. Instruments of ratification and the documents on accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Treaty will take effect in the relations between states that have deposited the instruments of ratification, after the depositing with the United Nations Secretary-General of the fifth instrument of ratification, including the instruments of the U.S.S.R. and the USA.
4. For the states whose instruments of ratification or documents on accession will be deposited after the entry of this Treaty into force, it takes effect on the day of depositing their instruments of ratification or documents on accession.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will immediately notify all the states that have signed or acceded to this Treaty about the date of each signing, the depositing date of each instrument of ratification and document on accession, the date of this Treaty's entry into force and about other notifications.

ARTICLE 11

The present Treaty, the Russian, English, Arabic, Spanish, Chinese and French texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who will forward duly certified copies of this Treaty to the governments of states that have signed the Treaty and acceded to it.

F. Background on Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. (Prepared by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe)

1. INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Soviet Union is party to a number of international agreements which guarantee basic human rights. The three most important documents are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

In 1948, following their commitment to the human rights purposes and principles in the U.N. Charter, members of the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which set the standards for the achievement and protection of human rights in the post-war world. The Universal Declaration is essentially an international bill of rights which recognizes certain "equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family", including freedom of speech, belief, religion, movement, as well as freedom from arbitrary arrest, torture, and slavery. The United States voted for the Declaration while the Soviet Union abstained. However, although not legally binding, all member nations of the U.N. are morally bound to adhere to the Declaration. In fact, the Declaration has had great moral force and, indeed, legal effect, inspiring national constitutions and international covenants on various specific rights.

International Covenants on Human Rights

Having proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. turned to transforming those principles into treaty provisions which establish legal obligations on the part of each ratifying country. Eventually it was decided that two covenants were needed: one dealing with civil and political rights; the other with economic, social and cultural rights. The prevailing view was that separate covenants should be adopted because civil and political rights could be secured immediately whereas adequate economic, social and cultural rights could only be achieved progressively, according to each nation's available resources.

It took 18 years before agreement on the formulation of rights acceptable to a majority of the U.N. members could be reached. On December 16, 1966, the General Assembly adopted the International Covenants on Human Rights. Another decade passed before a sufficient number of nations—35—ratified the Covenants; they entered into force in 1976.

The Covenants establish an international minimum standard of governmental conduct, guaranteeing the rights of each nation's citizens. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights assures the rights of self-determination; legal redress; freedom of movement; fair, public and speedy trial; privacy; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; peaceful assembly; trade union rights; and forbids discrimination; torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; arbitrary arrest and imprisonment for debt. These rights are not absolute, however, and there may be limitations imposed on such freedoms, but only insofar as they are necessary to protect "public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others". In any case, limitations on these rights must be prescribed by law.

The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights commits a government to take steps for the progressive realization of rights to the following: employment; safe working conditions; social security; education; health care; trade unions; and to participate in cultural life, creative activity and scientific research.

The Soviet Union ratified both Covenants in 1973; the United States has not ratified either although President Carter signed the Covenants and sent them to the Senate for ratification in 1977. However, despite American failure to ratify the Covenants, the Soviet Union is legally bound to adhere to the provisions of the Covenants.

Helsinki Final Act

In accordance with the desire of the 35 signatory countries (the U.S., Canada, and all of Europe except Albania), the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in 1975, is not a legally binding document. Nevertheless, the participating states generally accept the proposition that, by signing the Final Act, they have given solemn, political commitments to fulfill their declared intentions. They can be held publicly if not legally accountable by the other signatories. So accepted is this concept that not one of the participating states has relied on the non-binding nature of the Final Act as a defense to non-fulfillment of its provisions.

The Helsinki Agreement covers three major components of East-West relations: military security; economic, industrial and scientific cooperation; and humanitarian issues including basic human rights and specific concerns such as family reunification, travel, information flow, educational and cultural exchange.

The document itself is comprised of three "baskets"—diplomatic jargon for sections. The first basket contains ten "principles guiding relations between states" including inviolability of frontiers (Principle III), non-intervention in internal affairs (Principle VI), respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Principle VII), and self-determination of peoples (Principle VIII). In addition, Basket I deals with certain aspects of military security and disarmament.

Basket II discusses cooperation in the economic sphere, including science and technology. There is a section known as Basket II B, which deals with the issues of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Basket III encourages cooperation in humanitarian fields: the expansion of human contacts across borders by facilitating the reunification of families, bi-national marriages, travel, tourism, and family visits; the improvement of access to printed and broadcast information; improvement in the working conditions for foreign journalists; and expansion of cultural and educational exchanges.

Finally, there is a section entitled "Follow-up to the Conference" which calls for periodic meetings of the signatory countries to review the record of compliance with the Final Act provisions. The first meeting of this kind took place in Belgrade from September 1977 to March 1978. The second follow-up meeting began in Madrid in November 1980 and, over two and a half years later, will conclude this month.

The Madrid concluding document constitutes some advance over the Helsinki Final Act. The new or strengthened provisions in the Madrid document are focused largely on those areas of the Final Act—human rights and human contacts—where experience has shown that the greatest problems exist. Whether the reinforced language of the Madrid agreement will produce any better performance in these areas is open to question. Nevertheless, the new human rights and other commitments accepted in Madrid, even if ignored by the Soviet Union and its allies, should still have some beneficial effect in further highlighting the duplicitous nature of those regimes in the eyes of the rest of the world. This prospect alone may produce some improvement in Soviet compliance with both the Helsinki and Madrid agreements.

Apart from the new promises contained in the Madrid document, provision is made for a number of specialized or "expert" meetings on a variety of subjects, including one on human rights and another on human contacts. These meetings provide an additional spur for the Soviet and East European governments to improve their performance in these areas.

Outside the final document, the results of the Madrid Meeting seem mixed. On the plus side, the anticipated ending of the meeting with a balanced and substantive concluding agreement containing provisions for a security conference and the experts meetings on human rights and human contacts has met with great satisfaction among the Western allies and the neutral and non-aligned countries. At the same time, Madrid has failed to produce any credible sign that the Soviet Union intends to treat its new commitments as an obligation to cease the pattern of repression and persecution which has characterized Soviet behavior throughout the entire meeting. In fact, such behavior, ranging from curtailed emigration to increased political oppression, indicates that Soviet implementation of its Helsinki promises is at or near its lowest ebb since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

2. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE U.S.S.R.

Legal status

The Soviet Constitution provides for freedom of speech, press and assembly and guarantees the right of public trial and to practice religion. Each of these Constitutional provisions, however, is prefaced by a reference to the "interests of the working people" and it is the Communist Party which defines these interests. The Party reserves the right to decide which opinions and actions of Soviet citizens are acceptable.

Soviet laws are probably more significant than the Constitution in determining the actual exercise of civil and political rights in the U.S.S.R. Two articles in U.S.S.R. Criminal Codes provide for imprisoning individuals whose actions or views are deemed inappropriate by the Party. Someone accused of "anti-Soviet slander" can be imprisoned for up to three years, while someone accused of "anti-Soviet propaganda" can be imprisoned and exiled for up to twelve years. These two articles of the criminal code—as well as others—are routinely applied to penalize Soviet citizens who have peacefully advocated unorthodox views.

The isolation of Sakharov

In January 1980, the Soviet government decided to isolate Nobel Laureate, Andrei Sakharov, the best-known advocate of independent views in the U.S.S.R. Perhaps it was Sakharov's sharp criticism of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which finally impelled the Soviet leadership to take this step. Sakharov was stripped of all his government awards for science (although Sakharov has retained his membership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences) and ordered to stay in Gorky for an indeterminate period for "anti-Soviet actions." In Gorky, a city 250 miles from Moscow which is closed to foreigners, Sakharov is kept under virtual house arrest. Only Elena Bonner, his wife, is allowed to travel to Moscow.

Fearing their family was being held hostage, Sakharov and Bonner undertook a hunger strike in December 1981 to gain emigration permission for Liza Alekseeva, the fiancee of Bonner's son in the United States. Although the fast was successful and Alekseeva now lives in the United States, Sakharov and Bonner suffered major health setbacks. Sakharov's cardiac and prostrate problems worsened, while Bonner suffered a heart attack in Gorky on April 25, 1983. In Moscow, doctors confirmed her serious condition. On June 2, two Academy doctors visited Sakharov and diagnosed him as needing hospitalization. Bonner has refused to enter the Moscow Academy hospital until her husband is also allowed treatment in the same hospital.

Recently, Elena Bonner has said, rather than remain in isolation in Gorky, Sakharov would be willing to accept an invitation to teach in the West. Such invitations

have been sent from Austria and Norway. Despite a statement in April by the Soviet Minister of Justice that Sakharov would probably be permitted to leave the U.S.S.R., on May 11, 1983, Tass announced that Sakharov would never be allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. due to his knowledge of state secrets.

Soviet unofficial citizens' groups

The Soviet government denies that Soviet citizens have the right to form independent informal groups to express views which differ from Party positions. According to Soviet spokesmen, only official organizations have the right to represent Soviet views either at home or abroad. In recent years, however, several groups of Soviet citizens have formed such unofficial groups.

Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups

After the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act—particularly after the Soviet government took the unique steps of publishing the complete Final Act text in *Pravda*—unofficial groups were organized to monitor Soviet compliance with its human rights provisions. The first such group was organized by 11 citizens in May 1976 in Moscow and led to the establishment of similar groups in Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia. Allied groups with more specific aims were also organized: the Christian Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers; the Adventists' Rights Group; the Working Commission on the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes; and the Invalids' Rights Group. 51 members of the Soviet Helsinki Groups are now imprisoned or exiled. The threat of further repressive measures brought a halt to the work of the Moscow Helsinki Group in September 1982. Nevertheless, the documents produced by these Groups are a major contribution to Western understanding of Soviet human rights problems.

Soviet unofficial peace groups

In October 1981, 38 citizens of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, appealed to the Soviet authorities to include their countries in the official Soviet proposal to create a Baltic nuclear-free zone. Stung by this concerted expression of independent views in the Baltic states, the Soviet authorities arrested four signatories of this appeal.

Citing the need for greater citizen involvement in arms control issues, in June 1982, an unofficial peace group, the Group to Establish Trust Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was established in Moscow. The aims of the Trust Group include: a pen-pal program for Soviets and Americans; the establishment of reading rooms for Soviet and American literature for citizens of both countries; the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Moscow; international meetings of citizens' disarmament groups from various countries. Although the Soviet government welcomes such initiatives in Western countries, they have been swift to take action against the Trust Group, which has 16 members and 900 supporters in 12 Soviet cities. Four Trust Group members are imprisoned or in psychiatric hospitals.

3. NATIONAL AND ETHNIC RIGHTS IN THE U.S.S.R.

Multi-national composition of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union takes great pride in the face that it is a multi-national state. Indeed, Soviet representatives often point out that Americans only know about Moscow and usually very little about the diverse regions of their vast country. In fact, by referring to the Soviet Union as "Russia", we show a perception of the Soviet Union as being only Russian.

Although Russians are politically pre-eminent, the Soviet Union is in fact comprised of 15 republics. Each of these is granted the right in the Soviet Constitution to secede from the Soviet Union—at least in theory. These republics can be grouped in the following way: the three Slavic republics of Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia; the three Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia; the Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Kazakhstan; and four republics which the Soviet Union took control of during World War II—the republic of Moldavia, and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The U.S. Government does not recognize the incorporation of the three Baltic states into the Soviet Union, because it was as a result of secret treaty arrangements with Nazi Germany and military occupation.

Russification of non-Russian half of the U.S.S.R.

Members of majority nationalities in the U.S.S.R. face important handicaps—mainly the continual pressure from Moscow to "Russify" their languages and cultures. Protests at this situation are particularly strong in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia, with sometimes thousands taking to the streets in nationalist demonstrations—as happened recently in Georgia and Estonia.

Ethnic minorities

Dozens of diverse ethnic minorities also try to preserve their identities. Members of three ethnic minorities deported under Stalin still cannot return to their historic areas in the U.S.S.R.: 1 million Germans, 40,000 Meskhetians and 500,000 Crimean Tatars are all tied by recent Soviet laws to their places of exile in central Asia. Two million Jews in the U.S.S.R. face severe—and increasing—difficulties in preserving their ethnic culture. Unlike many other languages of ethnic minorities in the U.S.S.R., Hebrew has no official status.

4. RELIGION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Statistics on religion in the U.S.S.R.

There are many millions of religious believers in the U.S.S.R. With some 40 million Muslims among Soviet Turks and Persians, the Soviet Union is the fifth largest Muslim country in the world. There are about 40 million Orthodox Christians among Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Moldavians, Georgians and Armenians. Roman Catholicism is the traditional faith for some four million Lithuanians and Soviet Poles. Although it is illegal, adherents of the Greek Catholic Church can be found among millions of Ukrainians. There are also about 500,000 religious Jews and thousands of Buddhists in the U.S.S.R. Protestants include nearly one million Lutherans among Estonians and Latvians.

The situation of Evangelical Protestants in the Soviet Union is particularly complex. Some half million are represented by the official All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists. Thousands of others, particularly Baptists, Pentecostals and Adventists, have formed illegal groups rather than obey Soviet laws on religion. To escape further religious persecution, about 30,000 Evangelical Protestants want to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The Pentecostal "Siberian Seven" (seven members of the Vashchenko and Chmyknailov families who spent several years in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and whose emigration cases were resolved) represent two typical Evangelical Protestant families who tried for many years to emigrate from the U.S.S.R.

Soviet laws on religion

Every religious community must "register" with the state. To be legal, it must agree to abide by all Soviet laws on religion. Believers may not own their churches or make financial contributions. No one under the age of 18 is supposed to be inside a church. Children may be taught religion only by their own parents at home. All religious leaders and literature must be approved by the state. The state also controls access to seminaries. As a result, all religious groups face severe shortages of churches, religious literature and leaders.

Soviet religious prisoners of conscience

Two articles in the Soviet criminal codes permit imprisonment of believers who do not obey Soviet laws on religion. For example, there are some reform Baptist leaders who have spent as long as 20 years in Soviet camps for advocating their faith. About half of the Soviet prisoners of conscience are religious believers.

5. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE U.S.S.R.

Soviet spokesmen claim that their government takes care of the social and economic needs of 270 million Soviet citizens, by providing free medical care and education, low-cost housing, and the guaranteed right to work. (The International Labor Organization has found some Soviet work laws in violation of ILO obligations.) Soviet spokesmen do not point out, however, that Soviet citizens pay for these social services through hidden taxation—estimated at half the average income.

Forced labor in the U.S.S.R.

Recently, many Western press articles have been written about the use of forced labor in the Soviet Union particularly on the Urengoi gas pipeline to Western Europe. To date, there has been no definitive proof that the Soviet authorities have

relied on prisoners to build the Urengoi pipeline. It is, however, certain that the Soviet government relied on prison labor to build other gas pipelines. It is also certain that the Soviet authorities still rely on forced labor in major sectors of the Soviet economy, particularly in forestry and mining.

Estimates of the current numbers of people performing forced labor in the Soviet Union also vary widely. According to the State Department and unofficial sources in the U.S.S.R., currently there are 4 million prisoners engaged in various types of forced labor in the Soviet Union including "Prisoners of Conscience." According to Andrei Sakharov, there are as many as 10,000 Soviet citizens who are imprisoned for peacefully advocating their political, religious, national, ethnic or cultural rights in the U.S.S.R.

Social problems

The new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, has started a campaign against corruption among Party officials. This campaign could have important effects, since official corruption is widespread. As a result of such corruption, bribes are often needed before a Soviet citizen can get decent medical care, a private apartment, or entry to university.

Yuri Andropov has also tried to improve low labor productivity by promoting better work discipline. Yet even Andropov has admitted that it is hard to motivate Soviet workers to increase productivity because consumer goods and services are scarce and of poor quality.

Andropov has said that the severe shortage of food is the major domestic political problem facing the Soviet Union. Food rationing is in effect in many parts of the country. Before the forced collectivization of farms in the 1930's, Russia had been a major grain exporter. Today, the U.S.S.R. imports about 25 percent of its food needs.

Another major social problem in the Soviet Union is widespread alcoholism and frequent drug usage. In fact, Western specialists estimate that up to half the deaths in the Soviet population are linked to alcoholism. Alcoholism also contributes to low labor productivity and to the high divorce rate in the U.S.S.R.

Labor unions

Soviet representatives point to the many millions of members in official Soviet labor unions. The main function of such official unions, however, is to enforce Party orders and to try to maintain work discipline. Rather than advocating the rights of Soviet workers by raising low wages or improving poor working conditions, Soviet official labor unions are even forbidden to engage in strikes.

Frustrated at the inaction of such labor unions, Soviet workers have tried to organize independent labor unions. In late 1977, the Associaiton of Free Trade Unions of Workers (AFTU) was formed under the leadership of coal miner, Vladimir Klebanov. One year later, the Free Interprofessional Association of Workers (SMOT) was organized. Today, at least 22 Soviet citizens are imprisoned or held in psychiatric hospitals for their labor union activism.

6. SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY

Despite its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, therefore, its legally-binding commitment to guarantee to everyone the "right to leave any country, including his own," the Soviet Union does not allow its citizens to emigrate freely. The only recognized basis for emigration is family reunification and, in recent years, even this justification has been severely limited. As a result of such restrictions, Soviet authorities have permitted the emigration of only a few of the estimated 30,000 Soviet Evangelical Protestants who want to leave the U.S.S.R. The only three groups of Soviet citizens whom Soviet authorities have allowed to emigrate in any significant numbers are Jews leaving with visas for Israel, ethnic Germans going to the Federal Republic of Germany, and Armenians who originally immigrated to Lebanon and, more recently, to the United States. For all three groups, the rate of emigration has plummeted drastically in the last few years.

Soviet Jews

There are anywhere from 1.8 million (the 1979 official census figure) to 3 million (the estimate used by Western sources) Jews in the U.S.S.R. Jews are considered a national minority in the Soviet Union; their internal passports identify them as Jewish regardless of what religion they practice or where in the U.S.S.R. they were born. The vast majority are not observant although the resurgence of Jewish con-

sciousness that began in the late 1960s (after the Arab-Israeli Six Day War) has resulted in an increased interest by Soviet Jews in their culture, history and religion.

More than 250,000 Soviet Jews have emigrated since the Kremlin first allowed Jews to leave in the early 1970's, first, on the basis of "repatriation to their historic homeland" and, later, for the purpose of family reunification. All leave the U.S.S.R. with visas for Israel although about 100,000 have settled in the United States. While the number of Soviet Jews who have been refused permission to emigrate is known only to Soviet authorities (who do not publish these figures), there are at least 300,000 Soviet Jews who took the first step in the lengthy and cumbersome emigration process—that of requesting the requisite invitation from a relative in Israel—and who have not yet left the U.S.S.R. The National Conference on Soviet Jewry estimates that there are at least 2,800 "refusenik" families—people who have been refused exit permission more than once—representing at least 9,000 individuals. In addition, the Commission maintains files on those divided family cases that have come to its attention; at present, there are approximately 1,600 families representing perhaps 4,000 individuals on the Commission's Soviet Jewish caselist. Many of these families have been forcibly separated for over 10 years.

Emigration of Soviet Jews reached its highest level in 1979 when over 51,000 Jews were permitted to leave the U.S.S.R. This rate—which averaged over 4,000 a month—began to decrease in the fall of 1979 and has continued steadily downward since then. In 1982, less than 3,000 Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate; the monthly rate for 1983 is averaging about 100 a month, the lowest level in over a decade.

Soviet authorities have managed to keep emigration figures at this artificially low level not only by limiting the number of people who are given exit permission but, more importantly, by limiting the number of people who are eligible to apply to emigrate. In the spring of 1980, Soviet emigration authorities imposed new regulations restricting emigration only to those with first-degree relatives in Israel. While this new restriction is applied differently from city to city, and republic to republic, even in its most liberal interpretation, it refers only to parents, children and spouses. Only invitations from Israel delivered through the international mail are acceptable; for most Soviet Jews, an invitation from a first-degree relative in the United States or another country is not accepted. While, in the past, invitations were valid for one year and could be extended for another year at the Dutch Embassy in Moscow (which represents Israel's interests in the U.S.S.R.), they are now only valid for 6 months. Many offices of OVIR (the Office of Registration and Visas) have severely limited their hours of operation creating a backlog of would-be applicants. In recent months, "permanent refusals" have been given by OVIR authorities to a number of long-term refuseniks who had previously been allowed to resubmit their emigration applications every 6 months.

This drastic cut-back in emigration coupled with increasing manifestations of officially-sanctioned anti-Semitism—such as the publication of blatantly anti-Semitic literature, discrimination against Jews in employment and education, prohibitions against the teaching of Hebrew and expressions of Jewish culture, and the formation of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public—are ominous signs for the Jewish minority in the U.S.S.R.

Soviet Germans

According to the 1979 Soviet census, some 2 million ethnic Germans live in the Soviet Union, most of them in Russia and in the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tadzhistan. Soviet Germans constitute the fourteenth largest nationality in the U.S.S.R. Most are descendants of Germans who came to Tsarist Russia in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the majority of whom lived along the Volga River. In 1941, they were considered potential Nazi sympathizers and deported to Siberia and Central Asia. Despite the fact that Soviet Germans were politically rehabilitated in 1964, they were not permitted to return to their earlier places of residence in the U.S.S.R. and were not compensated for their material losses.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and the U.S.S.R. in 1955, some 83,000 ethnic Germans have resettled in the Federal Republic, most of them since 1970 when the Soviet-West German Non-aggression Treaty was signed. German emigration peaked in 1976 when 9,628 people were allowed to emigrate. Since 1977, the number of exit visas granted to Soviet Germans has decreased steadily; in 1982, only 1,958 received exit permission. The 1983 monthly average is about 115.

Although no precise information is available as to the number who want to emigrate, the German Red Cross and other reliable sources estimate that at least

150,000 ethnic Germans seek to resettle in the FRG. Many of the same tactics used to deter Jews from applying to emigrate are used against Soviet Germans. German religious organizations can be registered only if their members agree not to seek permission to emigrate; Soviet media portrays emigre life in West Germany as dismal and drug-ridden and characterizes emigrants as "traitors"; young men of families seeking to emigrate are drafted into the Soviet army; and, in recent years, many ethnic Germans have been tried and convicted on political or trumped-up criminal charges.

Soviet Armenians

Almost 23,000 Soviet Armenians have emigrated from the U.S.S.R. since 1970. Most of them, or their parents, immigrated to the U.S.S.R. after World War II when the Soviets launched a campaign to lure the Armenian diaspora to the Soviet Armenian Republic. (Approximately 200,000 Armenians responded to that call.) In the early 1970's, the majority of emigrating Armenians were resettling in Lebanon and other Middle East countries. When the 1976 civil war caused the borders of Lebanon to be closed, Soviet Armenians changed their destination to the United States, where most resettled in California. It is estimated that Armenians constitute 80 percent of Soviet emigration to the United States since 1976.

Armenian emigration reached its highest level in 1980 when about 6,000 were allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. for the United States. Paralleling the drop in Jewish and German emigration, however, less than 300 Armenians left for the United States in 1982.

Armenians are subjected to similar restrictions and bureaucratic obstacles that other would-be emigrants face and then some. Last year, however, the Yerevan OVIR began arbitrarily limiting the number of applications for emigration by distributing only two to nine application forms per week. As a result, a backlog of several hundred Armenians waiting merely to receive emigration applications was created.

STATISTICS ON EMIGRATION FROM THE U.S.S.R.

Jewish

1965 to June 1967	4,498
October 1968 to 1970	4,235
1971	13,022
1972	31,681
1973	34,733
1974	20,628
1975	13,221
1976	14,261
1977	16,736
1978	28,864
1979	51,320
1980	21,471
1981	9,447
1982	2,688

German emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany

1970	340
1971	1,100
1972	3,100
1973	4,400
1974	6,300
1975	5,800
1976	9,600
1977	9,300
1978	8,400
1979	7,226
1980	6,954
1981	3,773
1982	1,958

Emigration to the United States (of which approximately 80 percent is Armenian)

1970	250
1971	300
1972	500

1973	750
1974	1,000
1975	1,100
1976	2,600
1977	2,000
1978	1,700
1979	3,600
1980	6,109
1981	2,085
1982	339

○